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ABSTRACT

This dissertation discusses two separate aspects of commercial
bank regulation.

First, an attempt is made to discover which type

of branching laws tends to promote the greatest social welfare.
Currently there are three ways in which individual states may regulate
branching by commercial banks.

Unit-banking states allow no full

service branching by banks; limited-branching states allow full ser
vice branching on a less than statewide basis; and statewide-branching
states allow banks to establish branches anywhere within state boun
daries.

To date, no rigorous study exists which attempts to determine

if social welfare is a function of prevailing branching laws.
The second aim of the dissertation is to determine if the regula
tion of new bank entry has served to reduce social welfare.

At the

present time both the federal government and state governments require
prospective bank owners to apply for charters of operation.

As shown

in the dissertation, many of these applications have been denied.

The

result has been to lower the number of banks that a population in any
area of the country might face.
An empirical test is formed in order to answer these two ques
tions.

The test uses a new dependent variable, the elasticity of

loan demand for commercial banks.

This variable is a result of the

development of a theory of a banking firm, and is shown to be a better

viii

indicator of welfare losses than variables used in previous studies.
The results of the empirical test show that the restriction of new
bank entry has Indeed served to lower social welfare» and that of the
three types of branching laws, unit-banking leads to a higher social
welfare.

ix

CHAPTER X

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Commercial banking in this country is, in the true sense of the
term, a regulated industry.

For example, interest rates that banks

may offer on time deposits are regulated by the Federal Reserve,
and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and banks are pre
cluded from paying explicit interest on demand deposits or acquiring
common stocks.
This dissertation focuses on two other Important, and closely
related, aspects of regulation:

(1 ) the alteration of the structure

of commercial banking by federal and state agencies who restrict entry
of new banks into the Industry; and (2 ) the alteration of bank struc
ture by state laws and agencies that regulated the extent to which
existing banks can expand operations by establishing new branches.
By affecting bank structure, government regulation has an important
impact on bank performance and social welfare.

Concerning Restrictions on New Bank Entry
The requirement that a new bank must receive a federal or state
charter before it can begin operations is as old as the United States
itself.

The Intensity with which this requirement has been enforced,
1

2

however, has been subject to variation.

Before the Great Depression,

obtaining a bank charter was relatively easy.

The raising of minimum

capital requirements was often the only obstacle for a prospective
bank to overcome.

When many banks failed during the Depression, the

easy-chartering policy received much of the blame for these failures
because, it was believed, the policy had created an "overbanked"
situation.
The Banking Act of 1935, and many state laws passed about the
same time, were designed to curb the high rate of bank failure that
had characterized the Depression.

As a result of these laws, the

organizers of a prospective bank must demonstrate to the chartering
agency that there is a public need for a new bank and that the new
bank will be soundly managed and profitable without causing serious
losses to existing banks.

The Impact of these new guidelines for

bank chartering has been to reduce the rate of new bank formation
over the last forty years.
This restrictive chartering policy has been an effort to serve
the public interest.

In most industries, however, we seek to encour

age competition on the grounds that if competitive pressures are
strong enough to force some of the less efficient firms out of busi
ness, that is just part of the game.

It is the efficient firms

operating profitably with relatively low prices that will survive.
This line of reasoning is not generally carried over into banking,
where it is widely felt that banks must be shielded against the
vigorous competition that characterizes some industries.

The reason

3

for this difference lies in the view that the social costs of bank
failure are considered to outweigh whatever inefficiency results
from a policy of reducing competition by restricting new bank entry.
The major reason, then, for the restriction of new bank entry
is the fear of what failure of banks will do to the economy.

Whereas

in other industries a failure falls primarily upon the owners of
the businesses, a bank failure, it is felt, imposes losses on deposi
tors and also disrupts the payments mechanism.

It has long been

believed that the dangers of bank failure are so serious that govern
ment regulation is necessary to prevent them.
The problem with this argument is that a link between restricting
new bank entry and preventing widespread bank failures is highly
questionable in today's economy.

The failure of so many banks during

the Depression was due in large part to the mass withdrawal of deposits
by customers of the banks.

Today, federal deposit insurance guaran

tees to the depositor that his or her deposits, up to $40,000, remain
secure even if the bank fails.
fears of a recurring bank crisis
Great Depression.

This should in itself alleviate any
as the nation witnessed during the

If the possibility of widespread bank failures is

remote, the main impact of legal restrictions on new bank entry would
appear to be an Increased monopoly position for the commercial banking
industry, with all its social implications.

Concerning Regulations on Branching
The various states can also alter the banking structure by their
policies concerning the establishment of branches by existing banks.
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State laws concerning branching apply to both nationally-chartered
and state-chartered banks.

Unit-banking states, such as Minnesota,

allow no branch banking whatsoever, or restrict it to only one
llmited-service branch within the city limits in which the main office
resides.

Limited-branching states may Impose branching restrictions

in one of two main forms.

Some limited-branching states, such as

Tennessee and Louisiana, allow banks to branch only within the county
lines in which the main office resides.

Other limited-branching

states, such as New York and Mississippi, allow banks to branch into
neighboring counties, but do not allow banks to establish branches
statewide.

A statewide-branching state, such as California, allows

a bank whose main office is in that state to establish branches any
where within state boundaries.
Most states originally did not allow banks to establish branches,
and as late as 1910, only twelve states allowed it.

This situation

has changed slowly in the direction of more liberal branching laws, so
that as of the end of 1975 seventeen states allowed limited-area
branching and twenty states allowed statewide branching.

Only recently,

in 1973, Arkansas and Iowa, previously unit-banking states, began to
allow branching on a limited basis, and New Jersey, previously a
limited-branching state, began to allow statewide branching.
While there is some tendency toward more liberal branching laws,
there exists no widespread agreement as to whether more liberal branch
ing laws Improve social welfare by forcing banks to become more
competitive.

One line of reasoning runs that increased liberalization
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of branching laws may bring greater competition by allowing more banks
to establish a branch in any given market area.

On the other hand, a

second argument holds that more liberal branching laws could result in
greater monopoly power for existing banks, which can spread their
operations over a larger area, securing markets that could have been
claimed by newly created banks.

The more liberal are branching laws,

the stronger are both of these contradictory tendencies.

The net

effect of branching on competition in banking has never been firmly
established.

STATEMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Two major hypotheses are tested in this dissertation.

The first

hypothesis is that official restrictions on new bank entry have served
to decrease social welfare by Increasing the monopoly power of banks
in any one area.

This hypothesis will be tested while holding the

effect of branching laws constant, as there may be differences in
monopoly power due to differences in branching laws.

The hypothesis,

then, is that for any given branching law, policies that serve to
restrict the entry of new banks will increase monopoly power, and thus
lower social welfare from what it would otherwise be.
The second hypothesis involves an attempt to discover what impli
cations branching laws have for social welfare.

A priori, one cannot

state whether more liberal branching laws tend to Increase or decrease
social welfare.
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On the one hand, one might expect that competition is inten
sified, and social welfare increased, the more liberal are branching
laws.

This reasoning is based on the belief that the larger the

geographical area over which banks can establish branches, the more
potential competitors any one bank may face.
On the other hand, one must consider that the more liberal are
branching laws, the less will be the need for chartering officials
to supply additional banking services by chartering a new bank.
Rather, any additional banking services can be provided by the
establishment of a branch of an existing bank.

And, the more liberal

the branching law, the more widespread is this tendency.
The second hypothesis of this dissertation will be that the
second tendency is more powerful than the first.

That is, the more

liberal are branching laws the greater are the losses to social wel
fare.

Of the three types of branching laws that exist, unit-banking

leads to the lowest welfare losses and statewide-branching to the
greatest.

METHODOLOGY

Sample Selection and Size
In order to evaluate the two hypotheses, the entire national
banking market will be studied.

The states will be separated into

three distinct subgroups according to the relevant branching laws.
Each state is further subdivided into various economic regions.
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These regions are Che economic areas listed by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in its annual publication. Bank
Operating Statistics.

There are 297 of these regions, of which

167 are in unit-banking states, 111 are in limited-branching states,
and 19 are in statewide-branching states .1

The latter figure is

relatively low, of course, because the states themselves are the
economic areas.

The FDIC feels that in these states, statewide

branching is so prevalent that contrasting data by subsections of
the state would be meaningless since any bank may establish a branch
anywhere throughout the state.

Thus, area differentials on a smaller

than statewide basis would not Indicate true differences in the
behavior of different banks.

The Model
To test the two hypotheses, a statistical model will be developed.
The average elasticity of loan demand, E^, for each economic area for
the years 1968-1974 will be regressed against ten independent variables.
For this study, the three most important of these variables are XI,
population per bank for each economic area, and two dummy variables,

1Since Arkansas, Iowa, and New Jersey only recently changed their
branching laws, and since the time period of this study encompasses
the years 1968-1974, these three states, for purposes of this disser
tation, will be classified according to the branching laws prevailing
in those states before 1973. It is highly unlikely that the full
impact of the changes in their branching laws was felt during the
last two years of the time period in question.
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X9 and X10, which will indicate the type of branching law existing
in that area.

Specifically, X9 and X10 both assume values of 0

when a given economic area is located In a unit-banking state.

When

the economic area is in a limited-branching state, X9 assumes a value
of 1 and X10 assumes a value of 0.

When the economic area is in a

statewide-branching state, X9 assumes a value of 0 and X10 assumes a
value of 1 .

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

As stated above, the dummy variable for branching laws is impor
tant for testing both hypotheses.

Concerning the first hypothesis,

it is important that the effects of branching on the elasticity of
loan demand be held constant while the effects of population per
bank are analyzed.

It is the latter variable which indicates the

extent of restrictions on new bank entry in any given area.

The

greater the population per bank, ceteris paribus, the more restric
tive have been entry conditions.

If this variable is statistically

significant, and negatively related to the elasticity of loan demand,
then the first hypothesis can be accepted.

Restrictions on new bank

entry will have been found to lower social welfare by making banks
less competitive in any given area.
The dummy variables will be the basis of accepting or rejecting
the second hypothesis.

If one accepts the view that competition

increases the more liberal branching laws become, then this should
be reflected in the coefficients for the dummy variables.
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Specifically, both X9 and X10 should be positive and statistically
significant.

Furthermore, the coefficient for X10 should be larger

than the coefficient for X9.

If they are both positive and statis

tically significant, then it means that at a given level of population
per bank, both limited and statewide-branching result in greater
elasticities of loan demand than does unit-banking.

If the coefficient

for X10 is larger than the coefficient for X9, then it means that at
a given level of population per bank statewide-branching leads to a
greater elasticity of loan demand than does limited-branching.
However, if neither dummy variable is statistically significant
then the second hypothesis of the dissertation, that more liberal
branching laws lead to poorer performance by banks, can be accepted.
Statistically insignificant dummy variables Indicate that at any
given level of population per bank, there is no difference in perfor
mance among the three branching laws.

But, as will be shown In

Chapter II, population per bank rises the more liberal are branching
laws.

If the model shows that the elasticity of loan demand is

negatively related to population per bank, then the hypothesis that
unit-banking leads to better performance, and thus serves to lower
losses in social welfare, can be accepted.
Furthermore, if the first hypothesis is accepted, establishing
the fact that the elasticity of loan demand is a negative function
of population per bank, the extent of welfare losses due to regulating

entry into banking will be estimated.
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The first thing to be done

will be to estimate the actual welfare losses in each area.

These

losses, however, are due to both restrictions on new bank entry and
market imperfections in banking.

Next, the number of banks that

would have existed in the absence of regulation in each of the 297
economic areas will be estimated.

This results in a lower value for

population per bank in all the areas, which in turn will raise the
elasticity of loan demand, indicating a reduction in welfare losses.
Both of these losses will be separately summed over all areas to
arrive at an estimate of the national welfare losses with and without
restrictions.

These two figures will be directly compared in order

that the relative importance of regulating bank entry in contributing
to total welfare losses for the country can be isolated.

SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

As noted earlier, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze
the effects of entry and branching requirements on competitive con
ditions in the commercial banking industry.

The dissertation is

concerned with how, by altering the market structure of banking,
official agencies have affected social welfare by affecting the way
in which banks might set prices to customers.

‘‘■The dissertation will measure these losses under the assumption
that branching laws would have remained the same in the absence of
regulation as with its existence.
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Three related areas of Interest have been Ignored in this dis
sertation, however.

First our concern is how prices are a function

of the degree of competition rather than any scale advantages large
firms might enjoy vis-a-vis smaller firms.

The dissertation will

not investigate the possibility that commercial banking should be
regulated as a natural monopoly, since the existing literature on
bank costs shows conclusively that commercial banking is not characterized by constantly declining long-run average costs.

The general

consensus on this point is aptly stated by George Bentson:

The primary policy implication that may be drawn (from
the studies on bank costs) is that the authorities
need not be overly concerned about the existence of
a natural monopoly in banks were they allowed to grow
in size . . . the conclusion is that the banking
authorities should have few fears that unrestricted
competition would result in one or a few surviving
banks.^

The fact that banking is not considered a natural monopoly is
important to this dissertation because if it were, it would imply
that restrictions on entry should be imposed in order that a few
large banks could dominate the entire national banking market with
an extensive nationwide branching structure while being regulated as

^The costs in question here are administrative costs, or operating
costs that do not Include interest payments made to acquire deposit
funds.
^George Bentson, "The Optimal Banking Structure: Theory and Evi
dence," Journal of Bank Research, Vol. 3, (Winter, 1973), p. 225.
This article is also a very good survey of all the empirical research
on bank costs.
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a public utility.

A dissertation arguing for unrestricted entry of

new banks Into the industry In order to Increase competition would
then be Irrelevant.
Second, the dissertation will also Ignore the effect of bank
holding companies on the level of competition.

This omission is

justifiable because the literature on bank holding companies is
virtually unanimous in concluding that bank holding companies have
no appreciable effect on bank performance.^
Third, monopoly power in the deposit market will not be
separately studied.

That is, the conclusions reached will be based

on an investigation of the ramifications of entry restrictions and
branching regulations on the monopoly power of banks in the loan
market only.

However, since any bank is likely to exert a roughly

similar amount of power in either market, conclusions reached In this
dissertation could well be applicable to the deposit market as well.

^For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see William
Jackson, Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Behavior, (Richmond,
Va.: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1975); Robert'J . Lawrence,
The Performance of Bank Holding Companies (Washington, D.C., Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1967); Samuel H. Talley,
The Effect of Holding Company Acquisitions on Bank Performance, Staff
Economic Study No. 69, (Washington, D.C., Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1971); Stuart Hoffman, "A Florida Case Study:
Performance of Holding Company Banks," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Vol. 60, December, 1975, pp. 202-205; David D. White
head and B. Frank King, "Multibank Holding Companies and Local Market
Concentration," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Vol.
61, April, 1976, pp. 34-43; Joseph W. McLeary, "Bank Holding Companies:
Their Growth and Performance," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta, Vol. 53, October, 1968, pp. 131-138.
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In order to evaluate the two hypotheses, the dissertation Is
divided Into six chapters.

Chapter II will examine how the official

policies of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency and the various state
banking commissions have affected the market structure of commercial
banking in this country.

Since official regulations on bank entry

and branching have altered the structure of commercial banking, it
is important to know if this alteration has affected bank performance.
Consequently, Chapter III will review the literature on market struc
ture and performance in commercial banking.
exist.

Two broad types of studies

The first type investigates the impact of market structure

while either ignoring differences in branching laws across the sample
or by studying banks in only one state or in states with similar
branching laws.

The second type investigates the impact of different

branching laws on bank performance.

It is important to note that the

performance variables used in these previous studies differ from the
variable that will be used in this study as an indicator of bank per
formance.

Therefore, a description of these earlier studies merely

provides the reader with a review of the literature upon which the
dissertation will build.
Chapter IV will develop a theory of the banking firm which will
introduce a refined measure of the elasticity of loan demand as an
indicator of bank performance.

Furthermore, it will be argued that,

if the welfare implications from the regulation of bank entry and
branching are to be analyzed, then this variable is superior to the
traditional variables, used in the studies cited in Chapter III.
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Chapter V will be the empirical chapter that will test the two
hypotheses.

Furthermore, if the first hypothesis that restrictions

on new bank entry have served to reduce social welfare is accepted,
the impact of these welfare losses over the years 1968-1974 will
then be estimated.

Of the total welfare loss to society from com

mercial banking's less than perfectly competitive position, an
estimate will be made of the proportion of these losses that can
actually be attributed to regulation as opposed to market imperfec
tions.

No significance will be placed on the absolute monetary value

of these welfare losses.

All that is sought is a relative comparison

of the officially-induced welfare losses to the naturally-induced
losses.

Chapter VI will then present the summary and conclusions

of the dissertation and its Implications for official policy.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPACT OF OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY AND BRANCHING
ON THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

The purpose of this chapter is first, to describe official
restrictions on bank entry and branching, and secondly, to determine
if these restrictions have had any impact on the market structure of
commercial banking.

If these restrictions have affected market struc

ture then one can surmise that they may have influenced the level of
competition in commercial banking.

If this is the case, then it

follows that banks will alter their price and output decisions, thus
affecting social welfare.

The impact of these officially-induced

changes in the market structure of commercial banking on bank perfor
mance will be measured in a later chapter.

RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BANK ENTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE

The Background
Bank chartering in this country can be classified as a dual sys
tem.

A prospective new bank may apply for either a national or a

state charter.^

This separation of chartering powers has been in

*A national bank charter is granted by the U.S. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency. This agency must also approve all new
branches or mergers in which the surviving bank holds a national
charter.
It also acts on all applications of state-chartered banks

15
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existence for virtually as long as the United States has been a
nation.

The first banks chartered in this country received a state

charter in 1782, and in 1791 federal regulation began with the
establishment of the First Bank of the United States.

With the

demise of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836, however,
the federal government withdrew from any aspect of bank chartering,
leaving it entirely to the states.

In 1863, though, Congress insti

tuted the National Banking System, and since that time the dual system
of chartering has continued.
Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century
there existed what was called "free banking," which means that poten
tial bank owners only had to meet minimum capital requirements in
order to establish a bank.
became defunct.

However, from 1929 to 1933, 9,965 banks

This was over one-fourth of all commercial banks in

existence at the beginning of 1929.

2

The wave of bank failures during the Great Depression was felt
to be mainly the result of the unrestricted entry of new banks into
the industry during the pre-Depression era.

Unrestricted entry was

believed to have caused "excessive competition" in banking by

to become nationally-chartered. Approvals for state bank charters,
branches, and mergers must come from the respective state banking
commissions.
^Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, All-Bank
Statistics. United States. 1896-1955» (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. 33, Table A-l.
% . S . Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report, 1937. p. 14.
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creating too many banks than was actually needed to satisfy the
public's demand for credit.

The "over-banked" situation Is supposed

to have resulted in a rise In the failure rate of banks because of
an over-extension of unsound credit due to lack of adequate markets
for bank credit.^
Competition has usually been thought of as the dynamic process
by which inefficient businesses are eliminated by failure.

With

several exceptions such as public utilities, a natural monopoly, and
commercial banks, the price of business failure is not regarded as too
high for society to pay.
different.

The situation with commercial banking is

A bank failure, it is believed, is a community disaster,

however, wherever, and whenever it occurs.

While competition may be

desirable up to a point in banking, there is a clear limit, so the
theory goes, to its desirability.
For these reasons both federal and state chartering officials
felt that new bank entry must be restricted.

This attitude is clearly

expressed in the 1960 Annual Report of the FDIC.

With the experience of thousands and thousands of bank
failures between 1920 and 1934, attributed in many
instances to weak or under-capitalized banks in popu
lation centers unable to support them, bank chartering
authorities were alert to prevent a repetition of the
overbanked situation of the early 1920's. While it
may to some persons now seem a desirable situation to
have, as in 1921, more than 30,000 banks with open doors

^Economic Policy Commission, American Bankers Association, The
Bank Chartering History and Policies of the United States, (New York:
1935), p. 47.
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for borrowers and depositors throughout the United
States, bank supervisors and chartering authorities
of the 1930's and 1940's knew that many of these banks
closed their doors with great losses and hardships to
their depositors and were determined this would not
happen again.5

This philosophy was incorporated into the National Banking Act of
1935 and associated state banking laws around the same time.

No

longer was the satisfaction of minimum capital requirements the sole
requirement for new bank formation.

The National Banking Act of 1935

now required that for the chartering of a new national bank, the
Comptroller of the Currency must consider " . . .

the adequacy of its

capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general charac
ter of its management, and the convenience and needs of the community
to be served by the bank."®
State laws exist which also restrict new bank entry.

Indiana

law, for instance, requires that a prospective bank receive approval
by the State Department of Financial Institutions "at Its discretion.
Mississippi law requires that state chartering officials, when consid
ering a charter for a new bank, look at the "record of earnings and

^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, I960,
p. 36.
®Fublic Law 305, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Section 12B, Federal
Reserve Act, sub-section (g), 49 Stat. 684, 688; as cited in David
Motter, "Bank Formation and the Public Interest," National Banking
Review, Vol. 2, (March, 1965), p. 234.
^"Selected Bank Regulations in Eighth District States," Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monthly Review, Vol. 56, (July, 1974),
p. 20, Table A-II.
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condition of existing banks and the effects of a new bank upon them."8
Missouri law requires that chartering officials consider the "probable
volume of business in the locality sufficient to maintain solvency of
the new bank and existing banks, without endangering the safety of any
bank.9

State chartering officials in Tennessee are required to con

sider the "need in the community for a new bank, considering the
adequacy of existing banks.

The Effect on Market Structure
The philosophy that resulted in these new regulations has had a
definite impact on the market structure of commercial banking.
Increased restrictions on entry have served to keep the number of new
banks at a lower level that otherwise would have been the case.

This

is clearly seen in Table II-A, which shows the approval and rejection
rate for national bank charters for the period 1939-1974.

While sta

tistics on new bank charters granted by state banking commissions are
published, no data exist which shows the record of the number of rejec
tions made by state banking authorities.

Thus, the actual chartering

policy of these agencies cannot be explicitly tabulated.

However, it

is a safe assumption that state authorities generally follow the
policies of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency in not allowing the
free entry of banks.

Were they to allow free entry, it is unlikely

8Ibid.,

p. 20, Table A-II.

9Ibid.,

p. 20, Table A-II.

10Ibld.,

p. 20, Table A-II.
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that any bank would risk rejection of its application by even apply
ing for a national charter.

The fact that prospective banks apply

for national bank charters in the face of evidence that a rejection
is certainly likely is proof that state banking commissions have
followed restrictive policies as well.
The pattern that appears to emerge from the data of Table Il-A
is that chartering policy was especially restrictive immediately
after World War II and remained so until 1962.

At that time James

Saxon became Comptroller of the Currency, bringing with him a more
liberal attitude on bank chartering.

For two years, in 1962 and

1963, national bank chartering, in terms of the number of banks
chartered as well as the ratio of charters to rejections, reached
a new high in the post-Depression era.

This liberal policy tapered

off in 1964, which may account for the lower number of charter
applications in the few years shortly thereafter.

Bank chartering

was liberalized again, however, in the years 1968 and 1969 under
the direction of a new Comptroller, William B. Camp.

The early

1970's have seen a return to a more restrictive policy under Comp
troller James Smith.

It is worth noting, however, that although

rejection rates have been higher since 1969 than for the 1962-1969
period, the number of actual banks chartered has remained fairly high,
certainly above the period before 1962.

If one were to use the number

of banks approved for charters as an indicator of chartering policy,
then the entire period from 1962-1974 could be classified as a more
liberal era.
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Table IX-A
Applications and Approvals For
National Bank. Charters, 1939-1974

Year
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Source:

Received3
53
56
37
23
26
80
61
97
75
66
61
51
46
66
77
97
71
59
48
48
79
62
89
176
549
538
188
35
18
54
55
159
185
280
357
313

Approved

Rejected

Abandoned

21
28
11
12
13
41
16
43.
25
22
16
13
17
16
24
34
38
23
12
18
21
17
24
132
258
185
27
23
14
42
54
42
55
84
134
92

5
5
6
2
6
12
16
21
20
17
16
19
6
16
18
15
23
20
13
11
17
22
25
17
175
242
120
6
2
0
0
46
54
60
68
70

8
5
12
5
3
4
3
17
12
4
13
6
0
7
6
0
2
11
7
7
8
1
11
23
46
30
16
2
0
1
0
9
5
10
4
10

Pending at
the end of the year
19
18
8
4
4
23
26
26
18
23
16
.13
23
27
29
48
8
5
16
12
33
22
19
4
70
81
25
4
2
11
1
62
171
126
151
141

U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Reports, 1939-1974.

Applications received include those pending at the end of the
previous year plus applications for conversion rrom state to national
bank charters.
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State chartering officials have also followed a more liberal
chartering policy since 1962.

Table II-B shows this tendency.

Since

figures for approvals and rejections of applications for state banking
charters are not published, the policies of state banking commissions
are shown by considering the number of new state banks beginning
operations each year.

It is evident that state chartering officials

generally follow the same policies as the Comptroller of the Currency.
This similarity can be seen if one compares the number of state banks
beginning operations each year to the number of approvals for national
bank charters in the same year.

In other words, when one considers

the market for both national and state bank charters, the entire
period from 1962-1974 has been one of more liberal chartering policies.
As stated previously, the official policy on bank chartering is
that since a bank failure is a community disaster, what is lost in the
number of competitors is balanced by a reduction in bank insolvencies.
If this is the case then one would expect to see some kind of relation
ship between increased rates of bank formation and increases in bank
failures.

However, as shown in Table II-C, a look at the actual number

of bank failures in the 1950-1961 era relative to the number of bank
failures in the period 1962-1974 does not confirm this contention.
Since the number of bank failures in any one year is more likely
related to bank openings in previous years, the failure ratio used in
Table II-C shows the number of failures in any given year divided by
the average number of new bank openings, including both national and
state banks, over the previous five years.

For example, the failure

Table II-B
Number of New State Banks
Beginning Operations, 1950-1974

Year

Banks Beginning
Operations

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

52
42
46
47
75
78
65
64
65
91
79
82

Year

Banks Beginning
Operations

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

116
137
135
107
96
89
71
118
145
166
191
246
301

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual
Reports, 1950-1974
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rate for 1950, .053, was derived by-dividing the number of bank
failures in 1950, 5, by the average number of bank openings from
1946-1950, 94.
Obviously there are other things that could affect bank failures
in any year.

In particular the state of the economy can be expected

to exert a strong influence.

However, both periods, 1950-1961, and

1962-1974, contained both weak and strong economic periods, so that
the effect of the economy on bank failures should be fairly neutral
when comparing the two periods.
What is evident from Table II-C is that more liberal chartering
does not necessarily lead to an increase in failure rates.

In fact,

the average annual failure rate in the period 1950-1961 was .059,
which was higher than .035, the average annual failure rate in the
period 1962-1974.
Of course, Table II-C is hardly a rigorous proof of the argument
that more liberal chartering does not necessarily lead to increased
bank failures, but it is at least suggestive of that conclusion.

In

actuality, changes in chartering policies by themselves probably have
only a minimal effect on the failure rate of banks.

Rather, general

economic conditions are probably the primary determinant of the rate
of bank failures.

So many banks failed during the Great Depression,

because of the Depression Itself and not due to the pre-Depression
chartering policies.

Similarly, failure rates have been relatively low

over the past twenty-five years not because chartering policies have
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Table II-C
New Bank Openings and Failures,
1950-1974*

Year

New Bank Openings

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Source;

115
145
112
78
67
67
60
67
64
72
116
119
84
92
114
125
108
179
300
335
195
121
107
86
134
185
203
246
340
394

Bank Failures

Failures/Average Number
of Openings in Previous 5 Years

5
5
4
5
4
5
3
3
9
3
2
9
3
2
8
9
8
4
3
9
8
6
1
6
4

.053
.064
.059
.075
.060
.063
.034
.033
.094
.029
.019
.085
.025
.011
.039
.041
.036
.019
.016
.072
.080
.042
.005
.018
.016

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Reports,
1945-1974.

^ h e s e data are the sum of national and state bank openings for
each year.
Some discrepancies will exist between these data and the
sum of figures for Tables II-A and II-B because the data in Table II-A
are approvals for national bank charters in any year, and an approval
for a bank charter does not necessarily mean the bank will actually
begin operations that same year.
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been restrictive to some degree, but because economic conditions have
been generally good.
The fact that more liberal chartering does not appear to have any
relationship to a rise in bank failures should not be surprising.
Many of the bank failures during the 1930fs could have been prevented
had deposits been insured.

As it was, the threat of bank insolvency

was enough to warrant a run on banks by depositors.

This possibility

is virtually eliminated today by the deposit insurance offered by the
FDIC.

Even if bank failures had shown a significant increase over the

period 1962-1974, which they did not, it is unlikely that depositors
would have panicked.
Establishing that restrictive chartering does indeed exist and
that it lowers the number of banks that otherwise would exist does not
answer the question of by how much have new bank formations been
reduced.

In a 1966 study, Samuel Peltzman tried to empirically esti

mate the effect of the Banking Act of 1935 on the formation of new
banks.-*-*-

He assumed that new bank formation was related to several

key economic variables, taken from the period 1921-1962.

In order to

compare both regulation and non-regulation eras, Peltzman computed the
number of new banks that were actually formed during the regulation era
and compared this figure with the number of new banks that would have
been formed in the absence of regulation as predicted by his model.

^ S a m u e l Peltzman, "Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and Pur
pose ," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking Structure,
Administrator of National Banks (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 285-289.
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The difference, of course, is the effect of regulation on new bank
entry.

Peltzman's basic model is shown below.

e

t

= a
i

+ B- In
l

tt,.

, + B_ In D + B, In C + B. y
t-1
2
t
3
t
^ t

+ Bc C^)
+ m + x + B,R + u
5
S t
t
t
6 t
t
where,

et = the number of new commercial banks formed in year t, as a per
cent of the number of banks existing in year t
= the expected rate of return on capital in banking in year t
(the ratio of market to book value for banks in year t-1 times
the average yield in year t-1 on Moody's Aaa bonds.)
D fc » total deposits, net of cash assets, in year t
= total capital invested in banking in year t
ht = risk of capital loss in year t

(AJL)

= intended percentage change in capital size per bank in year t
t
m t = the number of banks merging in year t, as a per cent of the

S

number of existing banks in year t
x t = the number of banks failing and liquidating, net of reopenings,
in year t, as a per cent of existing banks in year t
Rt = the effects of regulation:

when year t is prior to 1936

R t = 0; when year t is 1936 and after R t a 1
u fc = a random error term.
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Peltzman asserted
the current rate
merger rate.

that the risk of capital

offailure

loss Is

and intended size change

is

related to
related to the

These relationships are expressed in linear form:

(11)

“ o2 + B?xt

<12>

<f>t

- «3 +

Vt

The logic behind the second function is as follows.

Suppose there is

an increase in the size at which a bank's per unit costs become con
stant.

This will cause some previously efficient banks to become

inefficient.

Such firms will want to grow more rapidly than the

average to attain the new minimum efficient size, or they will wish
to leave the industry.

Either action will lead to an increase in

the average size of banks.

The same is true for entrants.

An exten

sion of scale economies will discourage those firms which had intended
to enter at the previous minimum efficient size from doing so.
will increase their entering capital or drop out.
will be fewer and larger banks.

They

The net result

One important way in which some firms

can grow faster than the average is by acquiring other firms.

Simi

larly, one way in which a firm may leave the industry is by selling
out to another firm.

Therefore, any increase in scale economies

should be reflected in an increased merger among existing banks.
Since the extension of scale economies will cause the intended size
of firms to increase, the merger rate should be a good proxy for the
Intended rate of change of firm size.
(12) into Peltzman's basic model we get

Substituting equations (11) and
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et " al + B1 ln ^t-l + B2 '*,n D t + B3 ln ct + B4^a2 + B7 xt^

+ Bg(ag + Bg mt) + ij. + xt + Bg Rt +
or,

et "^a l + a2B4 + a3B5^ + Bi

+ (1 + B4

ln "t-l + B2 ln D t + B3 ln C t

By) xt + (1 +

B5

Bg) m t + B6 Rt + u£

Peltzman predicted the following expected signs for each coefficient,
although

there was no discussion in his study of why they should,

a priori, turn out

as expected: B^ > 0,

> 0, Bg < 0, (1 + B4 By)

* 0, (1 + B- B ) < 0, and B6 < 0.

J

8

Although the theoretical model is expressed in natural logarithms
Peltzman converted from natural logarithms to common logarithms in
testing his model.

Using ordinary least squares analysis and aggre

gate annual data for the U.S. from 1921-1962, Peltzman arrived at the
following equation.

12

Standard errors for the coefficients are listed

in parentheses below each coefficient.

e
C

= .234 + 1.868 log
(.241)

The Durbin-Watson statistic

i - .047 x - .231 m t + .619 log D t
(.017) C (.064)
(.267)

-1.097 log C. - .579 IL
(.487)
(.117)
R2 - .871

^2The year 1933 was omitted from the study because Peltzman’s
source for new bank openings (Banking and Monetary Statistics, Federal
Reserve Board, 1956) did not distinguish in that year new openings
from reopenings of suspended banks.

30

was unreported, but Peltzman stated that It was In the Indeterminate
range, I.e., the test was Inconclusive concerning the hypothesis
that autocorrelation was present.
The important variable in the model, of course, is R t, the
effect of regulation on new bank entry.

As computed by Peltzman,

Bg is the average percentage point reduction in the annual entry
rate due to regulation.

In general, as a national average, restric

tions on new bank entry have caused the annual rate of entry to drop
by 0.579 percentage points per year.

Since the actual rate of entry

over this time period was 0.605 per cent per annum, this meant almost
a

50

per cent drop in the rate of new bank entry.
Adding the 0.579 figure to the actual entry rates for each year

since 1935, Peltzman computed that restrictions on new bank entry
had prevented 2,196 banks from being formed during the years 1936 to
1962.

However, he did note that some of these banks would have sub

sequently failed or merged with other banks.
thus a gross number of new bank formations.

The 2,196 figure is
To get a net figure he

multiplied the gross figure by .308, the number of failures and
mergers from 1936-1972 divided by the average number of banks for
the same period.

This figure, 677, represented the number of the

additional banks formed in the absence of regulation that would have
failed or merged with other banks.

Thus, the net number of additional

bank formations was estimated as 1,519.
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Peltzman*s model extended only through 1962, the year of the
advent of more liberal chartering policies.

Because of this, the

coefficient for the regulatory dummy variable ln the years 19621974 may be lower ln value than existed in the pre-1962 era.

In

order to determine the number of banks that would have existed in
1974 in the absence of regulation it is necessary that Peltzman*s
model be amended to take into consideration any change in policy
during the period 1962-1974.^
To determine the change, if any, ln chartering policy since 1962,
a new model was developed.

Peltzman's model was generally followed,

except that the expected profits variable in year t, defined as Pt_^
in the new model, was restated to be the actual profit rate that
existed in commercial banking in year t-1; and a second dummy variable
was introduced to estimate the influence of regulation in the period
1962-1974.

Other than these changes, the variables were the same as

in the Peltzman study.

The years 1963-1974 were added to those used

in the Peltzman study, but whereas the year 1933 was eliminated from
his study, the years 1933-1933 were not included ln the new model.
During those years, the expected profits variable was negative, as
banks actually lost money.

This negative value prevented the use of

logarithms for this variable ln the model.

Therefore, the updated

study covered the period, 1921-1974, omitting 1933-1935.

■L^The updating of the Peltzman model will be even more important
in Chapter V, when the hypothetical number of banks that would exist
in the absence of restrictions on entry becomes crucial to the compu
tation of welfare losses due to those restrictions.
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The specifie.ition of the new model is

Et = “o + “lPt-l + a2 \ + B3xt + V t
+

b^

+

b ?r 2

+ B5Ct

+ u

and R£ are defined as
R^ = 0 for the years 1921-1932; 1 for the years 1936-1974
R^ = 0 for the years 1921-1932 and 1936-1961; 1 for the years 1962-1974
In this new model the coefficient for

indicates the reduction

in the annual rate of entry of new banks for the entire period of the
study, 1936-1974.

The coefficient of

signifies any change in the

coefficient for R^ that occurs during 1962-1974.
has indeed been more liberal since 1962, then

If chartering policy
should be positive.

This would indicate a reduction in the effect of regulation on entry,
since Bg should assume a negative value.
Seven different equations, depending on how the independent
variables were specified, were estimated in an attempt to obtain the
best model.

These equations are listed in the appendix at the end of

the chapter.
In order to find a model that would explain as much of the depen
dent variable, Et, as possible, the independent variables were, in
some equations, expressed in logarithmic form.^

In addition, in

five of the equations, Dt and Ct were expressed in changes rather than
^ T o parallel Peltzman's model as closely as possible, common
logarithms were used rather than natural logarithms.
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in absolute amounts.

None of the equations provided a Durbin-Watson

statistic that could lead one to conclude, at the .05 level of
significance,
not exist.

that autocorrelation

among the

residuals

did

In fact, only Equation 1 had a Durbin-Watson statistic

in the indeterminate range.

The other six equations had Durbin-

Watson statistics that led one to conclude that autocorrelation did
exist

among

was selected.

the

residuals.

For

this

reason

Equation

1

The equation is stated below with the t-statistics

listed in parentheses.*'’
E

= -0.824 + 0.587 log p.. , - 0.687 log m
(-0.48) (2.43)*
(-1.80)

- 0.271 log x
(-1.53)

-1.724 log Dt + 2.548 log Cfc - 1.373 R-, + 0.599 R2
(-2.04)*
(2.76)*
(-5.05)*
(2.65)*
R2 - .714
D.W. statistic = 1.34

According to the equation, the regulation of new bank entry has

indeed served to lower the rate of additional bank formation.
indicated by the negative coefficient for R^.

This is

Furthermore, these entry

Although the same basic model as Peltzmanfs was used, except
for the specification of the expected profits variable and the intro
duction of a second dummy variable, two of the variables in this model,
Dt and Ct, had different signs for their coefficients, even though both
variables were statistically significant in both models. Perhaps this
was due to some structural changes in the economy during the period
1962-1974. The reason for this contradiction, though, is not important
for purposes of this dissertation. What is important is that the
coefficient of both dummy variables in the updated model are significant,
and in the predicted direction.

restrictions have been less severe since 1962, as indicated by the
positive coefficient for R^.

Specifically, the coefficient for R^

means that due to official restrictions on new bank entry, the rate
of new bank formation was lowered by 1.373 percentage points per
year during the period 1936-1961.

The coefficient for R2 means

during the more liberal chartering period of 1962-1974, the rate of
new bank formation was only reduced by (1.373 - 0.599) = 0.774 per
centage points per year because of official restrictions on entry.
Using these figures, then, it is possible to estimate the number of
banks that would have existed at the end of 1974 in the absence of
restrictive chartering.

The average number of banks in 1936 was

15»265 and the actual entry rate of new banks, as a percentage of the
average number of banks, was 0.38 per cent.
banks were actually formed during 1936.

This meant that 59 new

Using the coefficient of R^»

the entry rate in the absence of regulation would have been 0.38 +
1.373 = 1.753 per cent.

This means that in the absence of regulation

the number of new banks formed would have been 268.

In 1937 the

actual rate of entry was 0.40 per cent, so that in the absence of
regulation the rate of entry would have been 0.40 + 1.373 = 1.773 per
cent.

Multiplying this times the average number of banks for 1937,

15,016.5, results in a hypothetical number of new bank formations
of 266, instead of the 62 that actually took place.

This procedure

is followed for every year, except that for the years 1962-1974, the
actual entry rate is increased by 0.774.
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Using this method it was determined that the amount of additional
new banks that would have been formed in the absence of restrictions
on new bank entry would have been 6,727.

Of course, one would not

expect that all of these banks would have survived as independent
banks.

Some would have undoubtedly failed or merged with other banks.

As noted earlier, Peltzman took this into account by subtracting from
additional gross formations an estimate of the number of these banks
that would have failed or m e r g e d . T h e same procedure was used here.
The average number of banks ln any given year from 1936 to 1974 was
14,619.

The total number of failures and mergers during this time

was 6,025, or 41.2 per cent of the average.

Following Peltzman, one

can then estimate that 41.2 per cent of these additional bank openings,
or 2,772 banks, would have failed or merged with other banks.

This

leaves a net total of additional bank formations in the absence of
regulation of 3 , 9 5 5 . ^

The number of independent banks in existence,

then, at the end of 1974, can be estimated to be 19,321.

This is a

32 per cent increase over the 14,670 banks actually existing at that
time.

^ S e e page 30.
^ O n e could criticize this method by stating that with the addi
tional bank formations the failure rate would have increased; however,
Table II-C on page 25 showed the failure rates displayed no apparent
trend with the amount of new bank openings.
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RESTRICTIONS ON BRANCHING AND MARKET STRUCTURE

Restrictions on new bank entry are not the only way that regula
tory officials can affect the market structure of commercial banking.
Even if the Banking Act of 1935 had not been passed, state banking
officials would still have altered the structure of commercial banking
by imposing restrictions on the extent to which existing banks can
establish branches.

The rationale for branching restrictions dates

back to the demise of the Second Bank of the United S t a t e s . ^

The

closing of the Second Bank was attributed largely to rivalries between
states and regions.

Western states were fearful that eastern interests

would control the Bank and that funds would flow to large financial
centers in the East.

Prohibition of branching across state lines, it

was assumed, would keep control of financial resources of the state in
local hands, and would speed up development.

Branching restrictions

within states were motivated by many of the same reasons.
Regulations on branching are imposed by the various state banking
commissions, or by existing state laws.

These regulations are enforced

on all banks within the state regardless of the origin of the bank's
charter.
forms.
II-D.

Branching laws within states may take one of three different
A classification of states by branching law is shown in Table

Unit-banking states allow no branching whatsoever or limit it

to one or two limited-service facilities within close proximity to the
18

Donald Jacobs, "The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation:
An Appraisal," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking
Structure, o p . cit.. p. 347.
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Table II-D
Classification of States by Branching Law
Unit

Limited

Statewide

Arkansas8

Alabama

Alaska

Colorado

Georgia

Arizona

Illinois

Indiana

California

Iowaa

Kentucky

Connecticut

Kansas

Louisiana

Delaware

Minnesota

Massachusetts

Hawaii

Missouri

Michigan^

Idaho

Montana

Mississippi^

Maine

Nebraska

New Hampshire

Maryland

North Dakota

New Jersey3 »b

Nevada

Oklahoma

New Mexico^

North Carolina

Texas

New Yorkb

Oregon

West Virginia

Ohio

Rhode Island

Wyoming

Pennsylvania^

South Carolina

Tennessee

South Dakota

Wisconsin^

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

aChanged their branching laws ln 1973; since this study encom
passes the years 1968-1974* these states will be classified by the
laws prevailing before 1973.
bAllow lnter-county branching either Into adjoining counties
or within a 100-mile radius of the bank's main office.
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main office.

For example, Che state of Illinois allows no bank to

establish full-service branches, i.e., those offices that can both
accept deposits and grant loans.

Instead, it allows a bank to

establish a limlted-service branch, one that may accept only deposits,
and then "not more than 1500 feet from the home office and generally
more than 600 feet from another bank's premise.
Limited-branching states allow some form of branching within the
county in which the home office resides or allow inter-county branch
ing, usually into adjoining counties only, or within a 100-mile radius
of the home office.

Kentucky, for instance, allows a bank to establish

full-service branches wiuhln the county in which the home office
resides as long as the branch is not to be established in the home town
of another bank or within one mile of any other bank's branch.
Tennessee imposes no restrictions on county-wide branching.

Mississippi

law stipulates that a bank may establish a maximum of fifteen branches
anywhere within a 100-mile radius from the home office, but not in any
city or town with a population of less than 3,100 and one or more
existing bank offices.2®

Statewide-branching states usually allow

unlimited branching of full-service offices within the boundaries of
the state in which the home office resides.

However, one state,

■^"Selected Bank Regulations in Eighth-District States," o p .cit.,
p. 22, Table A-IV.
20Ibid., p. 22, Table A-IV.
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Virginia, allows a bank to establish branches anywhere within state
boundaries only if the branch is acquired through the merger with
another b a n k . ^
The one noticeable diffefence in the commerical banking structure
among the various states is that population per bank increases, while
population per bank office decreases, the more liberal are branching
laws.

This is shown in Table II-E, which shows figures as of June

30, 1972.

Two population per bank variables are listed.

One is

simply the total population of each state divided by the number of
banks in each state.
its annual reports.

This variable is the one listed by the FD1C in
However, it is not representative of the actual

number of competitors faced by a given Individual bank since the entire
state is not an accurate approximation of the market for loans for any
one bank.

As noted in the legal decision concerning the U.S. vs.

Philadelphia National Bank case,

For the vast majority of banks and bank borrowers and
depositors, banking business is principally local in
nature. The factor of inconvenience localizes banking
competition as effectively as high transportation costs
in other Industries.22

21Bruce Sumner, "Regulations Affecting Competition Between Banks
and Thrift Institutions in the Fifth District," Economic Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Vol. 62, (May/June, 1976), p. 17.
^U.S.
358 (1963),
Banking and
Competition

vs. Philadelphia National Bank et. al., 374 U.S. 321 at
as quoted i n Bernard Shull and Paul Horvitz,
"Branch
the Structure of Competition," in Studies in Banking
and the Banking Structure, o p .cit., p. 351.
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A better indicator of the actual degree of competition would be
to divide the population of the state by the number of independent
banks in each county, summing over all counties in the state.

For

unit-banking states, and limited-branching states that prohibit
branching across counties, this population per bank variable would
be identical to the one described above.

Mathematically, for these

states,

where

is the population of the t*1*1 state,

in that state, and b^j is the number
state, where there are n counties.

is the number of banks

of banks in county

of the i*1*1

For those states that allow state

wide branching or allow some form of inter-county branching, the two
population per bank variables would not be identical.

This is because

an individual bank can branch into more than one county, so that the
same bank can be counted more than once when the number of banks is
being summed over all the counties in the states.
It should not be surprising that population per bank Increases
while population per bank office decreases as branching laws become
more liberal.

A new office in a unit-banking state can be established

only by the chartering of a new bank, while in limited-branching states
existing b a n k s within the permitted area of branching can supply the
additional bank services.

In statewide-branching states any bank

within the state can provide these services.

Therefore, one should
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Table II-E
Population Per Bank and Population Per Bank Office
By States, Grouped According to Branching Laws, As Of
June 30, 19'/2

Unit-Banking States
Pop/Bank-la

Pop/Bank-2^

Arkansas

7,818

7,818

4,305

Colorado

9,135

9,135

7,435

Florida

16,024

16,024

11,880

Illinois

10,435

10,435

8,803

Iowa

4,097

4,097

2,885

Kansas

3,711

3,711

3,320

Minnesota

5,180

5,180

4,954

Missouri

6,900

6,900

6,078

Montana

5,576

5,576

4,522

Nebraska

3,312

3,312

3,093

North Dakota

4,042

4,042

2,622

Oklahoma

5,985

5,985

5,065

Texas

9,475

9,475

8,825

10,222

10,222

8,645

Wyoming

6,001

6,001

4,726

Average

7,179

7,179

5,839

State

West Va.

Pop/Bank Office 0

aDefined as the population of the state divided by the number of
- banks in that state
^Defined as the population of the state divided by the number of
banks in each county in that state summed over all counties
cIncludes limited-service offices in the denominator
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Table II-E
(continued)

Limited-Branching States
State

Pop/Bank-1

Pop/Bank-2

Pop/Bank 0:

Alabama

12,857

12,857

5,949

Georgia

10,875

10,875

5,327

Indiana

12,968

12,968

4,805

9,618

9,618

4,588

Louisiana

15,630

15,630

5,577

Massachusetts

37,335

37,335

6,078

Michigan

27,335

20,546

5,609

Mississippi

12,434

9,342

3,977

New Hampshire

10,280

10,280

5,354

New Jersey

34,750

24,524

5,481

New Mexico

15,000

13,357

4,953

New York

60,216

32,801

6,281

Ohio

21,143

21,143

5,624

Pennsylvania

26,620

18,198

5,169

Tennessee

12,961

12,961

4,644

Wisconsin

7,371

6,665

4,944

20,463

16,785

5,275

Kentucky

Average

Table II-E
(continued)

Statewide-Branching States
State

Pop/Bank-1

Pop/Bank-2

Pop/Bank Office

Alaska

32,500

6,792

4,166

Arizona

92,619

29,034

5,172

127,925

36,082

6,066

Connecticut

48,920

27,563

5,665

Delaware

29,736

21,078

4,556

Hawaii

73,545

34,957

5,219

Idaho

31,500

5,892

4,000

Maine

22,639

11,671

3,572

Maryland

36,540

20,013

5,861

Nevada

65,875

14,385

5,323

North Carolina

56,673

11,142

3,826

Oregon

46,425

13,752

5,296

Rhode Island

60,500

30,546

4,888

South Carolina

27,600

12,058

4,683

4,270

3,264

2,601

Utah

21,653

10,809

5,519

Vermont

11,000

6,934

3,447

Virginia

18,980

9,183

4,068

Washington

37,423

17,571

5,004

Average

44,529

18,541

4,680

California

South Dakota

Source: Population per bank office and Pop/Bank-1 are from the FDIC's
Summary of Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks. June 30.
1972; Pop/Bank-2 was computed using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits in
All Commercial And Mutual Savings Banks. June 29. 1972.
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expect that population per bank increases as branching laws become
more liberal because chartering officials, in order to satisfy the
demand for more banking services, are less constrained in the avail
able banks they can draw from.
The fact that population per bank office decreases as branching
laws become more liberal can be answered in terms of differences in
barriers to entry between the three types of branching systems.
Shull and Horvitz feel that regulatory barriers to new bank
office entry are slighter the more liberal are branching laws.

It

is their contention that in states which allow branching, chartering
officials are more likely to allow the establishment of a new bank
office in the form of a branch of an existing bank than would be
officials in unit-banking states where a new office can only be
established by the opening of a new b a n k . ^

The reason for this

policy is that a branch bank of an existing bank will usually provide
less competitive pressures on existing banks than a new bank would.
Since a new branch is a part of an already existing organization, it
would be less likely than a new Independent bank to take measures
that would threaten to decrease its own organization's profits.
Chartering officials will then not have to worry about imposing serious
harm on existing banks.

Furthermore, if a branch turns out to be

unprofitable it can be closed with little Inconvenience to depositors.

^ B e r n a r d Shull and Paul Horvitz, "Branch Banking and the Struc
ture of Competition," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking
Structure, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
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Economics, as well as regulatory barriers, are usually stronger
In unit-banking states than In states which allow b ranching.^

For

one thing, some communities may be able to support a branch bank but
not a unit bank.
banking business.

These communities sometimes have an unbalanced
Wealthy surburban communities may generate a

sizeable time deposit volume, but may have virtually no business loan
demand.

Other communities may be just the opposite.

This imbalance

between deposit and loan demand may be a deterrent to entry for an
independent bank which must more or less balance the supply of funds
with the demand.

Furthermore, in order to properly spread its risks

a unit bank must maintain some degree of balance in its loan portfolio.
Certain communities may offer only particular loan markets, which
could effectively deter new bank entry.

These problems are largely

overcome by the mobility of funds between offices of a branch system.
A lack of sufficient volume in certain areas is not as critical to a
branch bank as to a unit bank since the branch bank is simply an
office of a larger system whose overall portfolio is likely to be more
diversified than that of any of its individual branches.
These barriers to entry are likely to be greater for limitedbranching areas than statewide-branching areas.

Since there are less

banks per capita in statewide-branching states, chartering officials
would be less concerned over the possible harm to existing banks that
a new office would impose.

Furthermore, economic barriers would tend

^ D a v i d Alhadeff, "Barriers to Bank Entry," Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 40, (April, 1974), pp. 589-603.
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to be greater in limited areas, especially those which allow only
county-wide branching, since in many cases an entire county may not
offer a sufficient diversification of a loan portfolio and/or a
sufficient matching of the demand and supply of funds to permit as
many offices to exist as would be the case if any bank within the
state was allowed to establish an office within the county.

CONCLUSION

Without question the actions of both national and state chartering
authorities have served to alter the structure of the commercial bank
ing industry by restricting the entrance of new banks and the
establishment of branches of existing banks.

But whether or not this

alteration increases welfare losses to the public depends on the
assumption that affecting market structure had a direct impact on
bank performance.

A review of the literature on the question of

whether alterations in bank structure affect bank performance is the
subject of the next chapter.

APPENDIX
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE
REGULATION MODEL OF CHAPTER Ila

Dependent
Variable

Independent Variables

R2

D.W.

.714

1.34

.713

1.21

-0.824 + 0.587 log Pt_^ - 0.687 log m t - 0.271 log xt
(-0.48)
1.

(2.43)*

(-1.80)

(-1.53)

Et
-1.724 log Dt + 2.548 log C£ - 1.373 Rx + 0.599 R2
(-2.04)*

(2.76)*

-0.202 + 0.564 log p
(-1.61)
2.

(1.79)*

(-5.05)*

(2.65)*

- 0.292 m t - 0.007 xfc
(-1.84)

(-0.12)

Et
-0.644 log Dfc + 1.646 log Ct - 1.192 R 1 + 0.498 R 2
(-0.91)

(1.92)

(-4.76)*

(2.33)*

APPENDIX
(Continued)
Dependent 1
Variable

Independent Variables

R2

D. W.

.686

1.08

.754

1.21

.744

1.10

0.182 + 0.594 log Pt_^ - 0.384 log m t - 0.061 log x fc
(0.34)
3.

(2.23)*

(-0.96)

(-0.39)

Et
+ 0.045 (Dt - D ^ ) 2 + 0.096 (Ct - C^ ) 2 - 1.154 ^
(0.78)

(1.57)

0.744 + 0.086 p
(1.92)
4.

(-4.17)*

(4.83)*

- 0.281 mt - 0.001 x £

(2.25)*

(-1.85)

(-0.01)

Et
-0.001 (Dt - D

x) + 0 . 0 0 1 (Ct - Ct_x) - 0.998 ^

(-1.77)
0.905 + 0.441 log p
(3.79)* (1.95)*
S.

+ 0.806 R 2

(4.01)*

(-4.55)*

+ 0.311 R 2
(1.39)

- 0.378 log m t - 0.132 log x t
(-1.13)

(-1.08)

Et
-0.001 (Dfc - Dt l ) + 0.001 (Ct - Ct_1) - 1.125 Rx + 0.62 R 2
(-0.67)

(3.36)*

(-4.59)*

(3.65)*

APPENDIX
(Continued)
Dependent
Variable

1.36 + 0.315 log p
(4.28)*(1.22)
6.

R2

D.W.

.768

1.22

Q
iHy

1.19

Independent Variables
- 0.134 m t - 0.070 xt
(-0.96)

(-1.17)

E
-0.001 (Dt - Dfc_j) + 0.001 (Ct - C
(1.75)

(2.36)*

x) - 1.154 ^
(-6.25)*

+ 0.603 Rj
(3.80)*

0.941 + 0.419 log Pt_^ - 0.260 log mt - 0.205 log xt
(1.75)
7.

(1.88)*

(-0.79)

(-1.73)

Et

«

-0.001 (Dt - D
(-1.64)

x) + 0.001 (Ct - C
(2.96)*

x) - 1.11 Rx + 0.69 R2
(-4.56)*

(4.51)*

t-statistics for each coefficient are in parentheses below the coefficient.
indicates that the coefficient is significant at the .05 level of significance.

An asterisk

Sources; 1921-1932 data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, AllBank Statistics, United States, 1896-1955; 1936-1974 data are from various issues of the Federal
Reserve Bulletin and the Annual Report of the FDIC.
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CHAPTER III

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE IN COMMERCIAL BANKING - THE EXISTING EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter II established that official policies on new bank entry
and branching have altered the structure of commercial banking, both
at the national and state level, by restricting new bank entry, and
thus have served to keep the number of banks smaller than otherwise
would have existed.

Secondly, the commercial banking structure has

been further altered by the particular branching law adopted by the
individual states.

Specifically, population per bank increases,

while population per bank office decreases, as branching laws become
more liberal.
The purpose of this chapter is to review past empirical research
concerning the relationship between market structure and performance
in commercial banking.

As stated in the introductory chapter, the

question to be investigated in this dissertation is whether the regu
lation of commercial bank entry and branching, by affecting the market
structure of banking, leads to poorer bank performance in the loan
market, thus contributing to welfare losses to the public.

Some light

has been shed on this question by previous studies, though, as will be
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argued later in this and the following chapter, there are shortcomings
to these studies which do not allow them to give a proper indication
of actual welfare losses caused by regulatory action.
This chapter is divided into two sections.

The first section

reviews those studies that consider the effect of increased concen
tration in banking markets on bank performance without explicitly
taking into account the effect of different branching laws on bank
performance.

This Is done by either studying bank behavior in one

state or in those states with similar branching laws, or simply by
studying a sample of banks drawn from all three types of branching
areas and then attempting to take account statistically of the separate
effects on bank performance of the different branching laws.

The

second section of the chapter will review the literature which exa
mines whether branching laws per se have any differential effects on
bank performance.

MARKET CONCENTRATION AND BANK PERFORMANCE

The earliest attempt to establish a statistical relationship
between concentration in banking markets and loan rates charged by
commercial banks was by Franklin Edwards.^

For his sample, Edwards

^Franklin R. Edwards, "Concentration in Banking and Its Effect
on Business Loan Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol.
46, (August, 1964), pp. 294-300.
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selected forty-nine metropolitan areas across the country.

As his

dependent variable he used average effective rates on small business
loans for each area as of October 5, 1955.

It was his contention

that for this particular bank product, the relevant market was the
metropolitan area, as small firms were unlikely to seek loans from
banks outside the metropolitan area in which they reside.

Edwards

regressed Interest rates on average loan size, the demand for business
loans, population growth, and a measure of concentration (the per cent
of total deposits held by the three largest banks in the metropolitan
area.

In addition he attempted to hold the effect of branching laws

constant by introducing a dummy variable for any area that was located
in a statewide branching state.

For this sample Edwards found a small,

yet statistically significant relationship between concentration levels
and interest rates on small business loans.

A ten per cent Increase in

the concentration ratio caused, on the average, an increase of six basis
points in loan rates.

Since the average rate in the forty-nine areas

at the time of the study was 4.94 per cent per annum, this would mean
a rise to 5.00 per cent.

Edwards failed to find any relationship

between the type of branching law and interest rates.

This, of course,

indicates that for any given concentration ratio, banks in areas where
statewide branching exists do not perform any better, or worse, than
those in unit or limited-branching areas.

2

^Edwards, though, could have Investigated the effects of branch
ing on performance further by determining If concentration ratios
differed significantly between unit, limited and statewide branching
areas. In fact, figures for June 30, 1964, published by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, reveal that three-bank concentration
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In a second study, Edwards investigated the relationship between
concentration and average rates on time deposits in the same fortynine metropolitan areas for the year 1962.

He found that rates on

time deposits were significantly, and negatively, correlated with the
two-bank concentration ratio in each area.

Specifically, a ten per

cent rise in the concentration ratio was found to cause a drop in the
average rate on time deposits by seven basis points.^

Unlike his first

study, Edwards failed to include any dummy variable for differences in
branching laws among the metropolitan areas.

For this reason his study

contains a possible bias, if rates on time deposits are an explicit
function of branching laws.
The findings of Edwards were confirmed in a study by Almarin
Phillips.5

He used Information obtained from the Federal Reserve's

"Quarterly Survey of Bank Rates on Short-Term Business Loans," for the
years 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1966.

Phillips estimated an equation for

ratios for SMSA's increase as branching laws become more liberal. The
average concentration ratios for SMSA's in statewide branching areas
was 82.9 per cent, while for SMSA's in limited-branching areas it was
75.7 per cent, and for unit-banking SMSA's it was 68.9 per cent. This,
of course, would indicate lower loan rates the more strict are branch
ing laws.
(Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of
Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks. June 30, 1964, pages
15-17, Table J.
^Franklin R. Edwards, "The Banking Competition Controversey," in
Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking Structure, o p . cit.,
pp. 303-334.
4 Ibid., p. 323.

’’Almarin Phillips, "Evidence on Concentration in Banking Markets
and Interest Rates," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 53, (June, 1967),
pp. 916-926.
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each year, regressing effective rates on short-term business loans
against several independent variables, including the three-bank
concentration ratio for the metropolitan area in which each bank
operated.

Phillips also introduced a dummy variable to take account

of the fact that larger banks make, on the average, larger loans than
smaller banks, which ceteris paribus, command smaller rates than loans
of lesser sizes.

His results revealed that for all four years of the

study, effective interest rates on short-term business loans were
significantly and positively related to the three-bank concentration
ratio.

Depending on the year studied, a ten per cent rise in the

concentration ratio caused a rise in interest rates of seven to ten
basis points.
The main criticism with Phillips' study, is the same as that
directed at Edwards' second study.

Specifically, by not introducing

a dummy variable to take account of differences in branching laws,
his study omits the possibility that at any level of concentration,
banks may charge different rates depending on the branching law under
which they operate.

As noted earlier, concentration increases the

more liberal are branching laws; therefore one might conclude that
Phillips' study is at least consistent with the view that banks in
unit-banking areas charge the lowest rates on short-term business
loans and banks in statewide-branching areas charge the highest.
The same criticism, that no explicit account was taken of the
fact that branching laws differed among the metropolitan areas, would

apply to a study by F. W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy.**

They attempted

to discover whether concentration has any effect on service charges
on demand deposits.

This variable was chosen because, in their

opinion, studies which used loan rates as the dependent variable
suffered from the fact that the interest rate offered on any loan
depends on the maturity of the loan, secured status, type of collateral,
etc.

Variations in interest rates could very well be the result of

changes in these variables, and since these variables are extremely
difficult to measure, a bias could be introduced into the study.
Using a concentration ratio that included the percentage of demand
deposits held by the three largest banks in metropolitan areas they
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between
concentration and service charges on demand deposits.
In a recent study by H. Prescott Beighley and Alan S. McCall the
bank market was defined as that for consumer Installment loans.^

It

was their contention that this market is limited to local metropolitan
areas because there is little searching by consumers for loans out
side these limits.

Also, there is little non-bank competition for

installment loans of the type sought from commercial banks.

Banks,

consumer finance companies, credit unions, retailers, and sales

^F. W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy, "Impact of Market Structure on
the Price of a Commercial Bank Service," Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 51, (May, 1969), pp. 210-213.
^H. Prescott Beighley and Alan S. McCall, "Market Power and
Structure and Commercial Bank Installment Lending," Journal of Money.
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 7, (November, 1975), pp. 449-467.
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finance companies perform somewhat different functions and often are
not permitted to compete effectively with each other.
Beighley and McCall were the first to use the Lerner index as
one of their measures of bank performance.

The Lerner index is

g

defined as CP - MC)/P*

The greater the disparity between price

and marginal cost, i.e., the more monopolistic the firm, the larger
is the value of this index.

They also used other conventional per

formance variables, such as profit rates per loan, and interest
rates on loans, and attempted to discover whether the Lerner index
was more directly related to market power than the conventional
measures.
For their sample, Beighley and McCall studies 1968 data on 184
metropolitan banks across the country.

The concentration variables

used was the Gini coefficient, which expresses the area between the
Lorenz curve of strict equality and inequality of distribution of
total bank assets in the metropolitan area as a percentage of the
total area under the curve of equal distribution.

Their empirical

research revealed that there was a significant, and positive, rela
tionship between the Lerner index for individual banks and the Gini
coefficient for the metropolitan area in which the banks operated.
Specifically, a ten per cent rise in the Gini coefficient caused, on
the average, a 2% rise in the Lerner index.

Furthermore, they found

Q

For a discussion of how MC was estimated in their model, see
Beighley and McCall, oj>. cit., pp. 451-453,
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a higher correlation between the Glnl coefficient and the Lerner
Index than other performance variables.
Beighley and McCall did acknowledge that since concentration
was greater where branch banking was allowed, It could be concluded
that banks in unit-banking areas perform better than those in
branching areas.^

Unlike Edwards' first study, however, Beighley and

McCall failed to Include a dummy variable for differences in branching
laws.

Thus, they failed to Investigate whether, at any level of con

centration in banking markets, banks perform differently under separate
branching laws.
Three studies have avoided the necessity of determining variations
in bank performance due to differing branching laws by studying market
concentration and bank behavior in areas that have the same branching
laws.^

George Kaufmann used the market for small business loans in

determining whether concentration had any significant effect on loan
rates and rates on time deposits.

Kaufmann's study was restricted to

banks in Iowa, a unit-banking state, because he had estimated that
about 90% of a typical bank's business in that state was obtained
within county l i n e s . ^

This justified his use of a county as the

9 Ibid., p. 462.

^ G e o r g e Kaufmann, "Bank Market Structure and Performance: The
Evidence from Iowa." Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 32, (April, 1966),
pp. 239-249; Robert F. Ware, "Banking Structure and Performance; Some
Evidence from Ohio," Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Vol. 54, (March, 1972), pp. 3-14, Alexander J. Yeats, "Further Evidence
on the Structure-Performance Relationship in Banking," Journal of
Economics and Business, Vol. 26, (Winter, 1974), pp. 95-100.
^Kaufmann, o p . cit.. p. 430.
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market area for an individual bank.

Using data for 1959 and 1960,

Kaufmann computed a concentration ratio that measured the percentage
of total deposits held by the largest bank in the county.

Included

in total county deposits when time deposit rates were the dependent
variable were deposits of savings and loan associations.

He also

included, regardless of the dependent variable used, the number of
banks in each county as a second concentration variable.
Kaufmann's empirical findings were, first, that the effects of
concentration and the number of banks in each county on loan rates
were statistically significant at the .05 level.

It was found that

a decrease of three banks in a county would, on the average, cause
a rise in the mean Interest rate from 6.0 to 6.15 per cent.

Also, a

rise in the concentration ratio by 15 per cent was found to result
in a rise in the mean Interest rate from 6.0 to 6.20 per cent.

For

interest rates on time deposits, both the concentration ratio and the
number of banks were significant at the .05 level.

An increase in the

number of banks in the county by three resulted in a rise in the
average rate on time deposits by sixteen to twenty base points.

A

15 per cent rise in the concentration ratio resulted in a lowering
of rates on time deposits by an average of twenty to twenty-six base
points.
The study by Robert Ware was restricted to 57 non-SMSA counties
in the state of Ohio.

This was done for two r e a s o n s . ^

First, the

banks in the non-SMSA counties, are, on the average, smaller than

l^Ware, p p . cit., p. 5.
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those in SMSA counties and generally derive from 80 to 90 per cent
of all types of deposit and loan business from their respective
counties.

Secondly, under Ohio banking laws, a bank cannot establish

branch offices outside the county in which the main office is located.
This aspect of the law has a tendency to restrict the influence of a
non-urban bank to the county market.

Both of these considerations

led Ware to conclude that counties would be useful indicators of a
banking market.
As ameasure of concentration Ware used a two-bank concentration
ratio, I.e., the proportion of total deposits in each county held in
the two largest banks.

For indicators of bank performance he used

five separate variables computed from annual data furnished by the
banks to the F.D.I.C.
within each county.

Each variable

was an average of all banks

These measures of bank performance are listed

below.
y
1

= total service charges on demand deposits
tot^l demand deposits

V_ a net operating earnings
total capital
V
3

Y

■ total revenue on loans
gross loans

= total interest paid on time and savings deposits
total time and Bavings deposits

- average price spread CV3 - V^)
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Using data for 1969 and 1970, Ware's empirical results failed
to show any consistent relationship between concentration in banking
markets and the five performance variables.

Only for one year, 1970,

and one variable, was the concentration variable significant at the
.05 level.

In this case a 10 per cent rise in the concentration ratio

led to an increase in the price spread, V^, of an average of eight
base points.
In the study by Alexander Yeats, bank structure in Louisiana and
Tennessee were investigated because it was felt that in both states
the relevant market for bank loans and deposits corresponded to county
lines.

The fact that both states limit branching to county lines

undoubtedly had much to do with this premise.
Yeats' market structure variable was the Herfindahl index, defined
as

where

the area.

is the proportional share of deposits of bank jL in

The index reaches a maximum of 1.0 for one bank counties.

For dependent variables he used the ratios (yearly income)/ (average
yearly capital) and (yearly income)/ (average yearly assets) as profit
measures.

Prices variables included (yearly interest paid)/(average

yearly time deposits) and (yearly interest earned)/ (average loans for
year).

The remaining performance variable was the average loan/deposit

ratio for the year.

The latter is sometimes used as a performance

variable because the higher the ratio the more it is felt that a bank
13
Yeats, o p . cit., p. 96*
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Is serving local customers Instead of extending funds In a more
nationally-oriented securities market.^
Yeats wished to take account of the fact that there may be no
significant relation between structure and performance at low levels
of concentration, but when concentration rises to some critical level
a measurable relationship may be found.

He first regressed all five

performance variables against concentration and other independent
variables, and found that, for 1970, the year of his study, in neither
Tennessee nor Louisiana did any evident pattern exist between concen
tration and bank performance.

In fact, only the loan/deposit ratio

for Louisiana showed any statistical significance at the .05 level.
However, the direction of influence was positive, the direction not
predicted by economic theory.
Yeats then substituted for the Herfindahl index a dummy variable
to distinguish markets above and below a certain critical concentration
value.

The dummy variable assumed a value of 1 when concentration was

above a certain critical value.

He used five different critical values

of the Herfindahl index, ranging from 0.20 to 0.60.

He found that by

using 0.60 as a critical value all five performance variables for
Tennessee were significant at the .05 level.

In addition the relation

ships were in the direction posited by economic theory.

The profits

and loan rate variables were all positively related to the dummy

14 A 11 variables were averages for all banks in a county.
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variable while the time deposit rate variable and the loan/asset
ratio were negatively related to the dummy variable.

What this

means is that bank performance was significantly different for banks
in counties with a concentration ratio of above 0.60 than for banks
in other counties.

The results for Tennessee using other critical

values for the dummy variable were not as consistent but did show
that the higher the critical concentration value used, the more
variables that were significantly related to concentration.

The

results for Louisiana did not Improve markedly with this method.
Only the loan/asset ratio was significant, and negatively related,
to the dummy variable, but then only for one critical Herfindahl
value, 0.50.
In summary the studies cited except for Ware's, are generally
conclusive on the fact that market concentration does have a negative
influence on bank performance.

To the extent that regulatory offi

cials restrict new bank entry, and thus intensify concentration in
any banking market, these studies indicate there is a loss in social
welfare.

BRANCHING LAWS AND BANK PERFORMANCE

Of the studies reviewed so far, with the exception of the first
Edwards study, the effect of branching on bank performance has not
been directly tested.

Conclusions about the impact of branching laws

have been inferred from the fact that since concentration in banking
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markets intensifies as branching laws become more liberal, banks in
unit-banking states are most competitive and banks In statewidebranching states are least competitive.

However, some studies do

exist which attempt to determine if branching laws have any separate
effect other than through differences in concentration.

It is theo

retically possible that at a given level of concentration, banks may
be more competitive the more liberal are branching laws.

This is

because branching can be thought of as a method by which the geographic
limits of banking markets are extended and the number of competitors
Increased.

The possibility of entry by banks outside a given market

area could force existing banks in that area to either practice limitentry pricing to deter entry or accept entry and be forced to lower
prices because of Increased competition.^

Either possibility results

in better performance by banks than if this threat of entry did not
exist.

If this thoery holds, then one would expect that at any level

of concentration, the more liberal are branching laws, i.e., the
greater the threat of entry, the more competitive banks must be.

This

being the case, population per bank office, which decreases the more
liberal are branching laws, is a more useful indicator of actual com
petitive pressures than population per bank, which increases as
branching laws become more liberal.

^ B e r n a r d Shull and Paul Horvitz, "The Impact of Branch Banking
on Bank Performance," in Studies in the Banking Structure . . .,
o p . cit., p. 176.
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Unfortunately, Edwards' first study is the only one which tries
to discover if performance differs at any level of concentration due
to differences in branching laws.

Even his study was restricted to

analyzing differences in unit-banking and branching areas in general
while ignoring possible differences in limited and statewide areas as
well.

Three studies have tried to answer the question of whether
liberalizing branching laws have any effect on performance by simply
comparing various performance variables among s t a t e s . ^

In their

study Shull and Horvitz made a tabular comparison of an average rate
on all loans between statewide-branching states and unit-banking
states for 1962 and 1963.

They found that average loan rates for

banks in statewide areas were higher in both years.

They attributed

the higher loan rates, though, to differences in loan portfolios
between statewide and unit-banking states.

17

Banks in statewide

branching states typically make more retail consumer loans than banks
in unit-banking states, and these loans typically carry higher yields
than other loans.

Thus the average interest rate on all loans is not

a true indicator of actual competitive conditions.

In fact, they went

so far as to conclude that because of the threat of potential entry

■^Shull and Horvitz, op, cit., pp. 141-177; Franklin R. Edwards,
"The Banking Competition Controversy," oj>. cit., pp. 303-334; and
Bernard Anderson, An Investigation into the Effects of Banking Struc
ture on Aspects of Bank Behavior (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The
Ohio State University, 1964), pp. 289-293.
17Ibid., p. 175.
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from a larger geographic area, statewide-branching provided a more
competitive atmosphere than unit-banking.

18

A conclusion such as

this, of course, is highly tentative since Shull and Horvitz did not
make any statistical tests to determine if the higher loan rates
in the statewide-branching states were actually caused by differences
in the loan portfolio.
Franklin Edwards' second study also presented a tabular comparison
of interest rates for banks in all the SMSA's in the United States.
Banks were separated into those that were located in unit-banking
SMSA's and those that allowed branching.

No differentiation was made

between limited and statewide-branching.

Edwards further divided banks

into deposlt-size categories.

His investigation revealed that except

for banks under $25 million in deposits, average rates on all loans
for 1962 were lower in unit-banking SMSA's than in statewide-branching
SMSA's.

Furthermore, except for banks with over $500 million in

deposits, banks in unit-banking SMSA's offered higher mean rates on
time deposits.

19

The study by Anderson was an attempt to discover whether another
performance variable, the loan/asset ratio, would differ according to
differences in branching laws.

In a 1962 study of banking in Cali

fornia (statewide-branching), Ohio (limited-branching), and Illinois

18 Ibid.. p. 176.

^ F r a n k l i n Edwards, "The Banking Competition Controversy,"
op. cit., p. 316.
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(unit-banking), Anderson concluded that the more liberal the branching
law, the higher were loan/asset ratios for banks.
The conclusions from these three studies, then, are mixed.

No

definite conclusion can be reached as to whether banks become more,
or less, competitive as branching laws become more liberal.
more, these studies are somewhat old.

Further

A glance at more recent data

might help to determine how bank performance is affected by differences
in branching laws.

Unfortunately, this investigation does not reveal

any firm conclusion either.

Tables III-A and III-B show 1974 data for

average Interest rates on all loans and loan/asset ratios for all banks
in the United States, grouped by states according to branching law.
The data reveal that loan/asset ratios do rise as branching laws become
more liberal but that average rates of return on all loans, for all
bank sizes, are lower in limited-branching than in both unit-banking
and statewide-branching states.

Furthermore, the latter have higher

rates than unit-banking states.

Of course, tabular presentations such

as these do not lead one to make any definite conclusions about the
effects of branching on bank performance.

There are other factors

which undoubtedly have some effect on interest rates and loan/asset
ratios which are not explicitly considered in a tabular presentation.
Furthermore, the interest rates listed are average rates for 1974 on
all loans,

if there are differences in loan portfolios between banks

under different branching laws, this could account for the differences
in the rates listed.

More recent 1974 data then, do not give any

more definite conclusions about branching than do the three earlier
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Table III-A
Average Rates of Return on Loans In
The United States, Grouped by States According
To Branching Law, 1974

Unit-Banking States
Rates of Return
Bank Deposit Size
(in millions of dollars)
Under 5M

5-10M

10-25M

25-100M

over 100M

Arkansas

9.50

8.90

8.99

9.07

9.65

Colorado

10.06

9.96

9.92

10.05

10.78

Florida

10 .8 6

9.97

9.56

9.58

9.94

Illinois

8.80

8.61

8.55

8.81

9.55

Iowa

8.69

8.61

8.46

8.65

9.30

Kansas

8.87

8.84

8.75

8.84

9.60

Minnesota

8.55

8.51

8.52

8.65

9.74

Missouri

8.59

8.65

8.76

8.81

9.31

Montana

9.39

8.82

8.69

8.99

9.09

Nebraska

8.61

8.59

8.84

9.00

9.88

North Dakota

9.59

9.24

8.80

8.58

—

Oklahoma

9.90

9.91

9.65

9.83

10.04

Texas

9.81

9.82

9.73

9.72

10.12

West Virginia

9.04

8.58

8.58

8.28

9.19

Wyoming

9.39

9.51

9.36

9.73

9.80

Average

9.30

9.10

9.00

9.11

9.72

State
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Table III-A
Ccontinued)

Limited-Branching States
Rates of Return
Bank Deposit Size
(in millions of dollars)
Under 5M

5-10M

10-25M

25-100M

Alabama

9.68

9.18

9.03

9.10

9.83

Georgia

9.40

9.29

9.25

9.59

10.96

Indiana

9.31

9.03

8.72

8.73

9.16

Kentucky

8.11

8.01

8.32

8.66

9.59

Louisiana

9.87

9.89

9.44

9.38

9.82

Massachusetts

9.83

9.53

9.38

9.64

10.27

Michigan

9.74

8.94

8.84

8 .8 6

9.23

Mississippi

8.96

9.24

8.74

9.22

9.43

New Hampshire

9.44

9.20

9.29

9.73

8.98

New Jersey

9.82

9.78

8.89

8.71

8.96

New Mexico

9.87

10.01

9.58

9.68

10.06

New York

9.03

9.01

8.78

9.10

9.62

Ohio

8.41

8.52

8.52

8.94

9.17

Pennsylvania

8.55

8,17

8.14

8.29

8.89

Tennessee

9.27

9.22

9.02

9.10

10.00

Wisconsin

8.72

8.54

8.57

8.67

9.53

Average

9.25

9.09

8.90

9.08

9.59

State

over 1 0 (
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Table III-A
(continued)

Statewide-Branching States
Rate of Return
Bank Deposit Size
(in millions of dollars)
State

Under 5M

5-1QM

10-25M

25-100M

over 100M

10.40

10.30

Alaska

—

10.90

Arizona

9.54

9.21

9.46

9.50

9.61

11.01

10.83

9.90

10 . 11

10.13

Connecticut

9.36

9.83

9.38

9.63

9.73

Delaware

8.04

8.77

8.35

8.49

9.16

California

—

Hawaii

—

Idaho

10.41

9.37

9.01

9.63

9.59

Maine

10. 22

9.71

9.62

9.79

10.46

7.97

8.64

8.41

8.67

9.38

9.87

9.48

9.48

Maryland
Nevada

—

—

—

11.30

—

10.15

North Carolina

9.71

9.97

9.17

9.83

10.21

Oregon

9.78

9.21

9.03

9.13

9.45

10.43

9.43

10 .2 1

9.18

10.14

South Carolina

9.44

9.19

9.23

9.53

10.15

South Dakota

9.00

8.79

8.67

8.85

8.76

11.03

10. 10

9.45

9.33

10.36

Vermont

7.93

8.41

8.40

8.83

9.42

Virginia

9.90

9.00

8.98

9.13

10.03

Washington

9.45

9.75

9.24

9.13

9.68

Average

9.57

9.48

9.31

9.37

9.80

Rhode Island

Utah

Source: FDIC, Bank Operating Statistics, 1974; where no entry exists
it is because no bank of that particular deposit size exists in the
state.

Table III-B
Loan/Asset Ratios, By State According To
Branching Law, 1974

Unit-Banking States
State

Loan/Asset Ratio

Arkansas

52.0

Colorado

58.9

Florida

53.3

Illinois

51.0

Iowa

54.8

Kansas

54.2

Minnesota

58.9

Missouri

54.1

Montana

56.8

Nebraska

55.4

North Dakota

50.4

Oklahoma

54.8

Texas

55.0

Wyoming

56.9

West Virginia

64.4

Average

55.4

Table III-B
(continued)

Limited-Branching States
State

Loan/Aaset Ratio

Alabama

53.7

Georgia

62.3

Indiana

5 5 .8

Kentucky

56.7

Louisiana

56.8

Massachusetts

62.1

Michigan

62.3

Mississippi

54.3

New Hampshire

66.6

New Jersey

59.2

New Mexico

60.0

New York

62.2

Ohio

59.2

Pennsylvania

60.7

Tennessee

57.4

Wisconsin

60.8

Average

59.4

Table III-B
(continued)

Statewide-Branching States
State

Loan/Asset

Alaska

55.1

Arizona

66.3

California

60.9

Connecticut

67.5

Delaware

64.3

Hawaii

61.8

Idaho

62.4

Maine

66.0

Maryland

64.1

Nevada

55.3

North Carolina

51.3

Oregon

56.5

Rhode Island

68.4

South Carolina

51.9

South Dakota

51.8

Utah

63.5

Vermont

67.6

Virginia

63.6

Washington

59.0

Average

60.9

Source;
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Bank Operating Statistics,
1974.
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studies.

The evidence is mixed, and therefore further study, such as

is presented in this dissertation, is ncessary before any general
conclusions can be made.

SUMMARY

To the extent that interest rates and loan/asset ratios are
meaningful indicators of the impact of bank performance on social
welfare the studies cited in this chapter are useful.

The first

section reviewed those studies that sought to find a relationship
between market concentration and bank performance.
studies are consistent in their findings.

Generally, these

Increases in concentration

lead to higher rates on loans, lower rates on time deposits, and lower
loan/asset ratios.

It has already been mentioned, however, that some

of these studies contain a possible bias, if at any level of concen
tration, performance differs because of differences in branching laws.
The second section of the chapter reviewed those studies which
attempted to discover if there were differential effects due solely
to differences in branching laws.

Unfortunately, the research on this

question is not extensive, gives Inconsistent results, and is insuf
ficiently rigorous to provide any definite conclusions.

Edwards'

first study was the only one to investigate the question scientifically
by Introducing a dummy variable in his model to differentiate between
unit-banking SMSA's and SMSA's where some form of full-service branch
ing was allowed.

His findings were that no differences exist in
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performance between banks, at any level of concentration, in unitbanking SMSA's and branching SMSA's.
There are further problems with those studies which used concen
tration ratios as an index of monopoly power.

If one is Interested

in measuring welfare losses from the restriction of new bank entry,
which this dissertation is, then concentration ratios may not be the
best indicator of how regulation has fostered monopoly power.

Concen

tration ratios, regardless of how they are defined, are probably
greater in any market than they would have been in the absence of
restrictions on new bank entry, but the exact magnitude would be dif
ficult to determine.

A better measure of the effect of regulation on

market power in any banking market is population per bank.

If one can

determine the number of banks that would hypothetically exist in the
absence of regulations on entry, a more useful population per bank
figure can be computed.

Then all that remains is to establish a rela

tionship between some performance variable and population per bank
where no restrictions on entry exist.

This will then provide an

estimate of how bank performance is altered by restrictions on entry,
giving an indication of how regulation contributes to social welfare
losses.
The selection of a proper performance variable, then, becomes
important.

A variable must be selected that is the most precise in

measuring welfare losses from market power in commercial banking.
The principle variables used in previous studies, i.e., interest rates
and loan/asset ratios, are not suitable for this purpose.

Another
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variable, the elasticity of loan demand, is superior.

The derivation

of this variable, and the establishment of its superiority, is the
subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

A THEORY OF THE BANKING FIRM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter Is to develop a model of the banking
firm which will Introduce the elasticity of loan demand as a perfor
mance variable.

This variable, which is indicative of the bank's

monopoly position in its loan market, is the most accurate measure
of social welfare losses due to this monopoly position.

As will be

shown later in the chapter, when the intent is to show welfare losses,
other traditionally used performance variables suffer from weaknesses
not found in the elasticity measure.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MODEL

Throughout this chapter it is assumed that commercial banks seek
to maximize profits from their loans by extending credit into any
market in which the marginal revenue earned from loans is greater than
the marginal costs of their extension.

In addition, it will be assumed

that the costs included in the model are long-run costs.

Since the

predominant conclusion of bank cost studies is that long-run costs are
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generally constant, it will further be assumed In the model that
long-run marginal costs are equal to long-run average costs.
The framework for the model was first presented by Bernard
Shull.^

Shull views a bank as transforming Its deposit funds Into

different credit products In a manner that maximizes profits.

Margi

nal cost Is assumed to be a function of the total volume of credit
offered by the bank and is assumed not to vary significantly with
changes In the credlt-product mix.

Profit maximization implies that

a bank will expand output into all credit markets where marginal
revenue exceeds marginal cost.

An equilibrium will be reached when

the marginal revenue obtained from any credit product is equal to the
marginal cost of extending credit in general.
of the model can be shown in Figure 1V-A.

The simplest example

The bank is assumed to

extend loans in only two markets, each of which exhibits different
demand conditions.

Equilibrium is achieved when OC^ of the first loan

type is offered at interest rate r^> and C-jC^ of the second loan type
is extended at rate ^ .

Any further extension of credit would mean

that the marginal revenue from either credit source is less than the
marginal cost of extending credit.

The credit mix is in equilibrium

because a transfer of equal credit from one type of loan to another

-1-See George Bentson, "The Optimal Banking Structure," Journal of
Bank Research. Vol. 3, (Winter, 1973), pp. 220-225.
^Bernard Shull, "Commercial Banks as Multiple-Product PriceDiscriminating Firms," in Banking and Monetary Studies, Deane Carson,
ed., (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 351-368.
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Figure IV-A
The Shull Model of the Banking Firm

r

MR

C

0

Loan Type 1

C
Loan Type 2

Credit Flow
Source:

Shull, o p . cit., p. 355.
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would mean a smaller gain In marginal revenue from one source than Is
being lost from the other.
Shull's contributions were refined In separate research by
Michael Klein and Eric Brucker.

Klein's development was mathe

matical, while Brucker's was geometrical.

For expository purposes

the Brucker model will be presented.
Both Brucker and Klein argue that the government bills market
for a bank's credit output can be viewed as a "dumping market" where
no one bank can affect the market rate and due to the short term
nature of the security, the market risk of capital gains or losses
can be neglected.

It follows that the average and marginal revenue

earned on bills are equal.

Following Shull, Brucker and Klein assume

that marginal cost Is not a function of the product mix.

Assuming

profit maximization on the part of banks, they then argue that total
credit output will be allocated so that the marginal revenue associated
with each and every credit product is equal to the average revenue
earned in the bills market.

A simple version of the model is presented

in Figure IV-B, which shows a bank making only one kind of loan.
Average revenue and marginal revenue are depicted for this loan
type as DL and MR^.

ARg and MRfi denote the average and marginal

M i c h a e l A. Klein, "Theory of the Banking Firm," Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 3, (May, 1971), pp. 210-213; and Eric
Brucker, "A Microeconomic Approach to Banking Competition," Journal
Finance, Vol. 25, (December, 1970), pp. 1133-1141.
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Figure IV-B
The Brucker-Klein Model of the Banking Firm
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Source:

Brucker, o p . cit.« p. 1134.
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revenue for government bills.
cost function for the bank.

M C t of course, describes the marginal
The total volume of credit allocated

would be OE, where the marginal revenue from each credit market is
equal to the marginal cost of total credit production.

OB would be

the amount extended in loans at interest rate OC and BE in bills
would be purchased at rate OA.
Using this model it is now possible to compute the elasticity
of demand facing the bank at point D for this particular loan type.
Consider the following expression of marginal revenue:

where AR^ is the average revenue per loan and e^ is the elasticity of
loan demand.

Since, in equilibrium, MR^ = MRg = ARg, the equation can

be expressed as

ARB “ ARg (1 - -1)
ARfi - ARl - A R ^
ABl/eL " ARL ” ^ B

This elasticity figure can be easily computed if one knows the
average revenue from both loans and government bills.

It should be

noted that this elasticity figure can be interpreted as a meaningful
indicator of the bank's relative monopoly power in this loan market

because it is simply the inverse of the Lerner index of monopoly
power, (P-MC)/P.^

Relatively speaking, a low value for eL and a

high value for the Lerner index both indicate a high degree of
monopoly power.

THE COMPLETE MODEL

The Brucker-Klein model contains a fundamental error in assuming
that the marginal cost of acquiring bank credit is not a function of
the credit mix.
ferent costs.

For one thing, different types of loans entail dif
These costs will differ, primarily due to differences

in risks and costs of obtaining credit information.

Secondly, the

cost of acquiring government bills is virtually non-existent.

It

cannot be assumed, then, as Klein and Brucker have done, that the
cost of lending an additional dollar In one loan market is necessarily
the same as in another loan market.

Nor can it be assumed that it

costs the same to acquire any additional dollar of loans as it does
to acquire an additional dollar in government bills.

^Consider that for any type of output, where ed equals the
elasticity of demand for that output,

MG - PCI - — i)
Therefore,

ed
MC - P - P/ed
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For this reason, the Brucker-Klein model must be modified.

The

revised model is shown in Figure IV-C.^
The profit-maximizing bank will not expand loan output until
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of loan extension.

Instead,

it will expand loan output until marginal revenue equals the marginal
cost of loan extension plus the marginal revenue obtained from govern
ment bills.

In other words the bank must consider the opportunity

cost of foregone revenues by not investing the marginal dollar in the
government bills market, where a positive yield can be earned.

Maxi

mization of profits would not occur where MR^ = MC^ because the profit
on the last dollar loaned is equal to zero and a positive return could
have been earned in the government bills market.

Frofit-maximization,

then, would entail

MR^ ■ MC^ + MRg or
MR^ - ACL + ARB 6

The question must eventually rise that if profit-maximization
entails expanding loan output until the marginal revenue of acquiring

^It should be noted that Figure IV-C also uses constant long run
costs for the reasons cited earlier. The demand and cost curves
describe conditions in one particular loan market, but the conclusions
readily apply to other loan markets as well.
^tfith n number of credit assets, including government bills, the
equilibrium conditions are more fully stated as

MR2
. . . ~
MRn
HC1 + MRg * MC2 + MRg
MCn + MRjj
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Figure IV-C
r

The Complete Model of the Banking Firm
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one asset equals its marginal opportunity cost, why, since the
acquisition of government bills is costless, and they always earn
a positive return, is there no limit to their acquisition.

The

answer to this question is found when one considers a general equi
librium for the banking firm, which involved the deposit, or liability,
market as well as the loan market.

The previous theories of the bank

ing firm have completely ignored the deposit market.
One possible way to show this general equilibrium is seen in
Figure IV-D, where it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that
a bank makes only one type of loan and acquires only one type of
deposit.

The marginal cost of obtaining funds is assumed to be an

increasing function, and includes the lost revenues from not being
able to loan out all acquired funds due to reserve requirements.^
In equilibrium the firm would acquire
total deposits less required reserves.

in net deposits, i.e.,
To maximize profits from these

funds it would extend OC^ in loans and acquire C 2 C 2 in government
bills.

It would not acquire any more government bills because the

cost of an additional dollar in deposits is greater than the y i e l d
of the government bill.

^A rising cost curve for deposits and a constant cost curve for
loans is not an unrealistic assumption, even if the costs considered
are long-run costs. As stated previously, the empirical research on
bank costs concludes that administrative costs are generally constant
in the long run. The marginal cost function for deposits in Figure
IV-D includes interest payments made on these deposits.
And, even in
the long run, banks can be expected to raise interest rates on these
deposits in order to attract a greater amount of funds.
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Figure IV-D
Equilibrium in the Asset and Liability Markets for a
Commercial Bank
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With this modification of the Brucker-Klein model the computa
tion of the elasticity of loan demand is altered.

The AC^ figure

does not now reflect the entire opportunity cost of making the loan.
The true opportunity cost is AC^ + ARg.

For this reason the elas

ticity of loan demand is now

e

L

AR l - (ACl + ARg)

THE ELASTICITY OF LOAN DEMAND AND THE MEASUREMENT
OF LOSSES IN SOCIAL WELFARE

Welfare losses to the public are directly related to the elas
ticity of demand facing any firm, whether it be a bank or a drug store.
This is because of the link between a firm's monopoly position and the
elasticity of the demand curve facing it.

One would expect that the

more competitors a firm has, the less monopoly power it holds, and
thus the more elastic is the demand curve facing it; therefore welfare
losses are smaller.
A technique for measuring welfare losses due to monopoly was
o
suggested by Arnold Harberger in 1954.

His ideas for their measure

ment were later used in subsequent empirical estimations of welfare
losses.^

The method is best described in Figure IV-E.

Assuming

O
Arnold C. Harberger, "Monopoly and Resource Allocation," American
Economic Review, Vol. 43, (May* 1954), pp. 77-87.
^David Kamerschen, An Estimation of the Welfare Losses from
Monopoly in the American Economy. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State University, 1964).
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Figure IV-E
Welfare Losses Due to Monopoly
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constant long run costs, an Industry that Is perfectly competitive
will produce at point C, where P * LMC - L A C .1 0

If the industry is

monopolized, and the cost function remains the same, output would be
restricted to

and price would rise to P^.

The welfare loss to

society is the loss in consumer surplus caused by the monopolist's
price and output decision.

This welfare loss is measured by triangle

ABC.
There is one comment to be made about the computation of these
losses.

The loss is less the more elastic is the demand curve for

the product.

This can be seen in Figure IV-F, which shows two demand

curves, one more elastic than the other.

For the sake of simplicity,

it is assumed that the demand and marginal revenue functions under
both conditions are such that the profit-maximizing level of output
is the same in both instances.

Geometrically, this means that as the

demand curve rotates counterclockwise around point C, the marginal
revenue curve is revolving counterclockwise around point B, thus
causing the distance between Pm and Pc to diminish.

The impact of

this qualification is that if the monopolist is subject to Increased

^ D e s p i t e the fact that long run costs are constant under perfect
competition, there still is a unique solution at output level Qc .
In perfect competition, of course, each individual firm faces a
perfectly elastic demand curve, and with constant long-run costs,
it would appear that there Is no unique equilibrium. However, the
long-run costs depicted in Figure IV**E are industry costs, and it
is certainly conceivable that the individual firms' cost curves
could be U-shaped while the cost curve for the industry is perfectly
horizontal. This possibility means that as the industry expands,
the individual firms' costs do not rise, i.e., each firm's U-shaped
cost curve remains stationary.
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Figure IV-F
Elasticities of Demand Curves and Welfare Losses
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competition, one would expect a gain In social welfare.

This gain

Is shown In Figure 1V-F by the difference between triangles ABC and
DB C .11
It Is now obvious that welfare losses to society from bank entry
and branching restrictions can be directly shown by using the model
for the banking firm developed earlier In the chapter.

Referring back

to Figure IV-C on page 84, welfare losses are denoted by tralngle FGH.
Some of these losses would undoubtedly exist, even if there were no
restrictions on new bank entry and anything other than unit-banking
was prohibited.

This is because, even if these two situations existed,

it is improbable that commercial banking would result in perfect com
petition.

However, official restrictions on new bank entry and

policies which allow branching could conceivably lower the elasticities
of demand for existing banks by reducing the number of independent
competitors.

This would serve to increase welfare losses above what

they normally would be.

H-Since one is working with
two different
demand curves thefact
that the elasticity of demand atpoint I) is higher than at point A is
not readily obvious. However, the fact that Pml is greater than Pm 2
assures this result.
Consider that

MRi - V U

- 1/ej.)

“ *2 ’ pm 2 ^ " 1/e2>
where e-i and e« are the elasticities
MR-l - MR 2 in Figure IV-F,

Fmi Cl " l/e^) “

of demand

for

each

curve.

Since

Cl " l/e2^

This means that since P . is greater than P ^ ,
e 2 to achieve the desired equality.

e^ must be smaller than
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THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ELASTICITY OF LOAN DEMAND
AS AN INDICATOR OF WELFARE LOSSES

If one's intent is to show the relationship between a bank's
monopoly power in the loan market and social welfare losses, the
elasticity of loan demand is a more meaningful indicator of these
losses than either the level of Interest rates that it charges or
its loan/asset ratio.

These latter two variables have been the most

often-used measure of bank performance.
A problem with using the level of interest rates as an indica
tor of bank monopoly power occurs in actual empirical studies when
the researcher does not use actual rates of return on individual loan
types but rather some average return on all loans.

Since the costs

of extending loans differ by type, two banks with the same average
return but different loan portfolios will not have the same average
elasticity of demand.

The bank with the high-cost portfolio will

have a higher elasticity of demand, and thus smaller welfare losses.
The studies by Ware and Yeats cited in the previous chapter made this
error in attempting to explain the relationship between concentration
in banking markets in Tennessee, Louisiana, and Ohio and certain per
formance variables, including the average rate of return on all l o a n e d

12Since this dissertation will be using figures for average rates
of return on all loans, this criticism of simple levels of rates is an
important consideration. This problem of using average rates on all
loans is overcome in the following chapter. Both average rates, and
average costs, for all loans will be used in computing the elasticity
of loan demand. Thus, a higher average rate of return caused by a
high-risk, high-cost portfolio will not necessarily indicate a high
degree of monopoly power because the average cost for all loans should
be high also.
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The loan/asset ratio is also a less efficient measure of welfare
losses than the elasticity of loan demand.

It is possible that two

banks may have the same loan/asset ratio but may exhibit different
elasticities of demand and thus different welfare losses.
Figure 1V-G.
loan markets.

Consider

In this simple case there are two banks in two separate
Both banks, it is assumed, offer only one type of

deposit and one type of loan.

Furthermore, they each have identical

cost functions, but face different demand curves.

The profit-maxi

mizing condition for both banks entails a loan/asset ratio of CK^/OC^
but Bank 1, because it faces a more elastic demand curve, charges a
1^
lower interest rate than Bank 2 . J

Welfare losses are therefore lower

for Bank 1 than Bank 2, as signified by the fact that triangle BCD
is less than triangle ACD.
It is even possible that a bank with a lower loan/asset ratio can
exhibit lower welfare losses than a bank with a higher loan/asset
ratio.

This situation is depicted in Figure IV-H, which again shows

the one deposit, one loan banks of Figure IV-G.

In this case, profit-

maximizing results in a loan/asset ratio for Bank 1 of OC 3 /OC 1 , which
is less than (X^/OC^, the loan/asset ratio for Bank 2.

Welfare losses

^ T h e reader is referred to footnote 11 on page 91 for an
explanation of why the elasticity of loan demand at point IJ is
greater than at point A.
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Figure IV-G
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Identical Loan/Asset Ratios - Differing Welfare Losses
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Figure iy-H
Lower Loan/Asset Ratio - Smaller Welfare Losses
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for Bank 1, indicated by triangle DEF, are nevertheless smaller than
the welfare losses from Bank 2, shown by triangle ABC.^
Furthermore, the elasticity of loan demand is the only perfor
mance variable that allows an actual estimation of numerical welfare
losses.

This is an important consideration since the computation of

welfare losses due to the regulations on new bank entry is an integral
part of the next chapter.
Suppose one wished to compare welfare losses of triangles ABC
and DBC in Figure IV-F.

One way to do this is to start at output

0QC, where price 0PC is charged, regardless of the demand curve that
exists.

Then one should compute how high prices would have to rise

in order to have output reduced to 0Qm . Prices would have to rise to
0Pm2 if demand conditions were represented by D2 and to 0Pm^ if demand
conditions were represented by D-^.

To compute the actual magnitudes

for OPmi and 0Pm2» one would need to know the average elasticity of
demand for the particular demand curves over the output range 0QC - 0Qm .
For example, to find 0Pm2» one would compute the percentage rise in
price, %aOPc, that would occur if output was reduced by a certain
percentage, %AOQc, from 0QC to OQm.

This percentage rise in price

is equal to (%AOQc)/eji, where e ^ is the average elasticity of demand
for demand curve

over the output range 0QC - 0Qm . OP^i would then

l^Again, since both marginal revenues are equated to a common
value, ARg + AC^, the reasoning in footnote 11 on page 91 is also
a valid explanation for why the elasticity of demand at point I) is
higher than at point A,
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equal 0PC(1 + %AOPc).

One would then have the necessary information

to compute the area of triangle ABC which would be the welfare losses
resulting from the demand conditions depicted by D^.

These losses

would be equal to 1/2 [(0QC - 0Qm) x (OPn,-) - 0PC)].
To find the welfare losses resulting from demand conditions
denoted by D2, one would follow the same procedure.

The percentage

rise in price would be equal to C%AQc)/ed2» where e.^2 is the average
elasticity of demand for demand curve D2 over the output range
0QC - 0Qm . 0Pm2 would then equal 0PC(1 + %AOPc).

The welfare losses

due to the existence of demand conditions, D2, which is the area of
triangle DBC, is equal to 1/2 [(0QC - 0Qm) x (0Pm2 - 0PC)].
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL FOR REGULATORY POLICY

The purpose of developing the model of the banking firm was to
introduce the elasticity of loan demand as an indicator of bank per
formance.

The purpose of showing that welfare losses are best measured

by the elasticity of loan demand is important if one is to establish
a link from entry and branching restrictions to the level of competi
tion in a banking market to social welfare losses.
of this link is the subject of the next chapter.

The establishment

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF ENTRY AND BRANCHING RESTRICTIONS
IN COMMERCIAL BANKING ON SOCIAL WELFARE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into two sections.

In the first section,

the two hypotheses set out in Chapter I will be tested.

In order to

do this a model will be developed that will attempt to explain changes
in the elasticity of loan demand facing commercial banks.

As argued

in the previous chapter, this variable is a better indicator of wel
fare losses in commercial banking than previously used measures, which
means that changes in this variable that are the result of regulatory
policy provide a more accurate estimate of how regulation affects
social welfare.

If the first hypothesis is accepted,, the magnitude

of losses in social welfare caused by restricting new bank entry will
be estimated.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

To test both hypotheses, a model to explain the average elas
ticity of loan demand for commercial banks over the period 1968-1974
is developed.

The model uses as its sample the 297 economic areas

listed by the FDIC in its annual publication, Bank Operating Statis
tics.

One-hundred sixty-seven of these areas are in unit-banking
98
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states, 111 are In limited-branching states, and 19 are In statewidebranching states.

For each of these economic areas an elasticity of

loan demand is computed.

As was stated in the previous chapter, the

elasticity of loan demand can be expressed as
AK l

®I. " ARl - (ARg + Af^)

The next task will be to define what data was actually included
In the computation of the elasticity of loan demand for each area.
The AR^ figure represents the average return on all loans, including
those made to state and local governments, but not those to the
federal government.

The rates on state and local bonds are included

because, unlike the market for U.S. government bonds, the market for
state and local government bonds does not present a commercial bank
with a perfectly elastic demand curve for credit.
This AR l

figure is computed as an average for all banks

in each

area over the period 1968-1974. The figure is computed from data
published in Bank Operating Statistics.

An average return for all

banks must be used because the FDIC does not list rates of return for
individual banks in each region.

The FDIC does list separately, for

each year, the average rate of return for banks in each region on all
loans granted to private individuals and businesses as well as the
average rate of return on state and local government bonds held by
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commercial banks.*

For example, in Economic Area 9 for Che state of

Florida for the year 1974 the average rates of return on loans to
private units was 10.13 per cent, while the return on state and local
bonds was 4.61 per cent.

Taking an average of all figures for the

years 1968-1974, the result is an average return on all loans to pri
vate units of 8.39 per cent and an average return on state and local
bonds of 4.40 per cent.

These figures were then used to obtain a

value for AR^ for this area.
However, a simple average of the two could not be used.

First,

interest earned on state and local bonds is tax exempt so that the
equivalent yield on a fully taxable basis is higher.

Since the

corporate tax rate has been roughly 48 per cent over the time period
of the study, the listed rate on state and local bonds was multiplied
by 1.96.

This procedure gave a better indication of the fully-taxable

yields on these bonds.

For example, the fully-taxable yield on state

and local bonds for 1968-1974 in Economic Area 9 of Florida was

4.40 x 1.96 - 8.62

The average rate of return on all loans made to private indivi
duals and businesses, as listed by the FDIC, is, for any given year,
equal to total interest earned on these loans during the year by the
banks in the area divided by the average amount of loans held by
banks during the year. The average rate of return on all state and
local bonds is the total amount of interest earned on these bonds
during the year by commercial banks divided by the average amount
of these bonds held by hanks during the year.
Since some of both
assets were undoubtedly acquired in previous years, the average return
on either asset will actually be some weighted average of rates that
prevailed not only in the current year but in previous years as well.
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Second, private loans and state and local bonds are not held In
equal amounts by banks In any particular area.

Thus, each rate must

be weighted according to the proportion of total credit that each of
the assets entail.

These proportions are also listed by the FDIC In

Bank Operating Statistics.

Over the period 1968-1974 in Economic Area

9 for the state of Florida, of total credit extended to private units
and state and local governments, 26.3 per cent was in state and local
bonds, and the remainder, 73.7 per cent, was in loans to private
units.

Thus, the weighted AR l figure used in the elasticity equation

for this area was

.263 (.8.62) + .737 (8.39) - 8.45

The same procedure was used to compute AR^ for all 297 economic areas.
The ARg figure in the elasticity equation is the average return
during 1968-1974 on all U.S. government securities held by banks iii a
given area.

For example, during the period 1968-1974 the average

return on all U.S. government securities held by banks in Economic
Area 9 for the state of Florida was 5.74 per cent.

There are two

reasons for using the average return on all U.S. government securities
rather than just U.S. Treasury bills.

The first is the practical

^For a given economic area, the average rate of return on U.S.
government securities in any given year, as listed by the FDIC, is
equal to total interest earned by all banks in the area on these
securities divided hy the average amount of those assets held by banks
during the year. For any year, then, the average rate of return listed
will be a weighted average of rates that prevailed in the current year
and previous years, since some of these securities were undoubtedly
acquired in earlier years.
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consideration that the FDIC does not publish separately the average
rate on Treasury bills, but rather combines this rate with those on
other U.S. securities.

Second, while the ARg figure should only

Include rates on risk-free U.S. government securities, the risk of
capital loss on U.S. securities other than Treasury bills Is probably
not so great as to warrant their exclusion from ARg even if more
detailed data were available.
The next step is to define how AC^ in the elasticity equation
was computed for each economic area.

As explained earlier the AR^

and ARg figures Include Interest rates on loans and bonds that pre
vailed before 1968.^

Therefore, the AC^ figure should also include

loan costs that prevailed before 1968.

The most exact data on admini

strative loan costs is published by the Federal Reserve in its annual
publication, Functional Cost Analysis.

The only years available to

the author were the years 1966-1973, so an AC^ figure for each economic
area was computed from data for these years.
The published cost figures, which are listed as a percentage of
each dollar invested in a particular loan type, are obtained from
questionnaires sent to 942 banks of varying sizes throughout the
county.

These rates are especially useful because they represent

what bankers themselves feel actual loan costs to be.

In the publi

cation Functional Cost Analysis loan categories are broken down into

^See page 1 0 0 , footnote 1 , and page 1 0 1 , footnote 2 .
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three different types:

commercial and agricultural; real estate; and

4
consumer Installment loans.

For each year the unit costs on these

different loan types are listed by bank size.

Table V-A shows a

listing for the year 1972.
An average unit-cost over all bank sizes for each loan type was
computed for the years 1966-1973.

The average was taken over all

banks because virtually all the economic areas include banks in each
Table V-A
Average Unit-Costs for Selected Loan Types,
by Bank Size, 1972
(as a percent of each dollar invested)
Bank Size
(in millions of dollars of deposits)
Loan Type

under 50

Commercial and Agricultural

1.353

Real Estate
Consumer Installment
Source:

50-200

over 200

Average

1.142

1.142

1.185

0.854

0.692

0.689

0.745

3.157

3.189

3.250

3.199

Federal Reserve Board, Functional Cost Analysis, 1972,
pp. 11-14.

of the three deposit-size categories.

The resulting figures show that

over this period the average unit-cost, as a percentage of each dollar
invested, of making a commercial or agricultural loan, was 1.19 per
4

No figure is listed for the administrative cost of acquiring
bonds of state and local governments. This omission is undoubtedly
due to the fact that the administrative costs of acquiring these bonds
is insignificant.
It will be assumed in this dissertation that these
costs are zero.
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cent; a real estate loan, 0.73 per cent; and a consumer Installment
loan, 3.24 per cent.
To compute these administrative loan costs for each economic
area the above figures were multiplied by the proportion of total
loans of each loan type existing In the economic area over the years
1968-1974.

These latter figures are also obtained from the FDIC's

Bank Operating Statistics.

As an example of how administrative costs

were computed, consider Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida.
Over the period 1968-1974, 27.9 per cent of total credit extended to
private units and state and local governments was In commercial and
agricultural loans, 17.7 per cent was in real estate loans, 28.1 per
cent was in consumer Installment loans, and 26.3 per cent was in loans
to state and local governments.

For this area, the estimated average

administrative costs of granting loans, as a percentage of the average
dollar loaned, was

1.19 (.279) + 0.73 (.177) + 3.24 (.281) + 0.00 (.263) - 1.37

Administrative costs, though, are not the only costs of extending
a loan.

Loans will carry some degree of risk, which is a bona fide

cost of granting a loan.

Therefore, the computed AC^ figure for each

economic area must include some proxy for risk.

This proxy was ob

tained by using, for each economic area, the variable (provision for
loan losses/loans), which Is published In Bank Operating Statistics.
This variable indicates how much funds, as a proportion of the average
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number of loans for that year, banks In the area put aside to cover
non-payment of loans they expect to default.

Since state and local

governments sometimes default on their bond repayments, it can cer
tainly be assumed that provisions for loan losses include possible
default by state and local governments on their bonds.
Since this variable provides a good estimate of what percentage
of loans will actually default, it thus serves well as a risk proxy.
The average for this variable over the years 1968-1974 was added to
the average administrative costs over the same time period to estimate
AC l for each economic area.

For example, for Economic Area 9 of the

state of Florida, the average for this risk variable was 0.39 per cent.
Adding this figure to the average administrative cost of making loans
gives an estimate of ACL for this area, as a percentage of each dollar
loaned, of

1.37 + 0.39 - 1.76

All the necessary variables have been obtained to compute the
average elasticity of loan demand for the area in the example.
elasticity is

e » _______ 8^45_______
T*

e

8.45 - (5.74 + 1.76)

L

-

8.45
8.45 - 7.50

L

0.95

eL - 8.894

This

X06

This procedure was repeated for all 297 economic areas listed
by the FDIC.

The statewide averages, which are the sums of all the

elasticities of each economic area in the state divided by the number
of areas, are listed in Appendix V-A at the end of the chapter.
In an attempt to explain the elasticity of loan demand in any
economic area, the area elasticities were regressed against eight
structural and demand variables and two dummy variables.

These vari

ables are listed below.
XI

= average population per bank in each economic area, 1968-1974

X2

= median family income in each economic area, 1970

X3

= proportion of total assets that were state and local bonds,
1968-1974, for each economic area

X4

= proportion of total assets that were commercial and industrial
loans, 1968-1974, for each economic area

X5

= proportion of total assets that were agricultural loans, 19681974, for each economic area

X6

= proportion of total assets that were real estate loans, 19681974, for each economic area

X7

= proportion of total assets that were consumer installment loans,
1968-1974, for each economic area

X8

= ratio of total credit-granting Institutions in the economic area
to the number of commercial banks in the area

X9

= 0 if the area

is

in either a unit-banking or statewide-branching

area; 1 if it is in a limited-branching area
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X10 - 0 if the area is in either a unit-banking or limited-branching
area; 1 if it is in a statewide-branching area.

The demand variables are X2 through X7.

X2, median family

income, will probably be positively related to the elasticity of
loan demand.

This relationship is due to the fact that a higher

income usually means higher educational levels.

High incomes, then,

would indicate that customers of banks are usually more knowledgeable
and will shop around more for better terms on loans, forcing banks
to become more competitive.
The variables X3 through X7 indicate how the elasticity of loan
demand will fluctuate with differences in the loan portfolio.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the elasticity of loan demand for any
particular loan type, and the greater the proportion of total assets
that are of this particular type, the higher is the overall elasticity
of demand.

The expected sign of each coefficient for these variables

cannot be determined

priori because so many factors need to be

considered.^

^Total assets, rather than total loans, was used in the denomi
nator for variables X3 through X7 because in computing AC^ for each
economic area the weighting factor was the proportion of total loans
of each individual loan type. Since AC^ was directly used in com
puting eL for each area, to use as an independent variable a figure
that was used in computing the dependent variable would create an
interdependence among the independent and dependent variables.
This
interdependence would bias the statistical results.
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X8 Is one of the structural variables in the model.

This variable

is the ratio of total credit-granting institutions in each economic
area to the number of commercial banks In the area, as of 1970.

Unlike

the coefficients for variables X3 through X7, the coefficient for X8
can be predicted a priori. One would expect that the more non-bank
competitors that borrowers face, i.e., the higher the value of X8,
the more elastic is the demand curve facing individual banks.
The variables that are crucial in testing both hypotheses are
XI, population per bank, and the dummy variables, X9 and X10.

XI is

the structural variable which indicates the degree to which new bank
entry has been regulated in any one economic area.

The higher this

value, ceteris paribus, the greater are the restrictions on new bank
entry.

One would expect that the higher this value the lower the

elasticity of loan demand in any area because of a greater amount of
monopoly power.

Mathematically, this variable is defined similarly to

population per bank-2 in Table II-E on pages 41-43, except that now
the variable indicates monopoly power for an economic area rather than
an entire state.

In this model
Xl± = _________ Pj(1970)___________

n
n
I h-HCWeS) + z b ..(1974)
3=1 3_________j=l
2
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where Xl^ Is the average population per bank in economic area i_, over
the years 1968-1974;

is the population of economic area i^ for 1970;

and b£j(1968) and b^j(1974) are the number of banks in county

in

economic area i. for the years 1968 and 1974 respectively.
Now, as shown in Chapter II, population per bank increases the
more liberal are branching laws.

The variable population per bank is

affected by both restrictions on new bank entry and branching laws.
Thus, any statistical relationship between XI and the elasticity of
loan demand may not be solely attributed to a policy of chartering new
banks.

To account for this factor, the two dummy variables, X9 and

X10, are used.

Ceteris paribus, the coefficient for X9, if significant

and positive, will indicate the extent to which the elasticity of loan
demand is greater in limited-branching areas than in unit-banking
areas.

Similar reasoning for statewide-branching areas would hold if

X10 were significant and positive.

One would also expect that if more

liberal branching laws increase competition, then the coefficient for
X10 would be greater than the coefficient for X9, signifying that,
ceteris paribus, elasticities of loan demand are greater in statewidebranching areas than in limited-branching areas.
These three variables, XI, X9» and X1Q, will be the basis for
accepting or rejecting the hypotheses set out in Chapter I.

If XI

is negatively related to the elasticity of loan demand, and statis
tically significant, then it can be concluded that by restricting new
bank entry, chartering officials have increased the monopoly power of
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banks, and thus have contributed to losses In social welfare.
Secondly, If neither X9 nor X10 are statistically significant, then
this will provide the basis for accepting the hypothesis that unitbanking Is the more competitive banking structure.

Statistically

insignificant dummy variables indicate that, holding all other vari
ables in the model constant, the elasticity of loan demand is not
affected by differences in branching laws.

One can then conclude

that since there is no difference in performance at any population
per bank, unit-banking, because it leads to a lower population per
bank, leads to better performance by banks and thus smaller losses
in social welfare.

Similarly, limited-area branching leads to better

performance, and smaller welfare losses, than statewide-branching
because it leads to a lower value of population per bank.
To test these hypotheses, thirteen separate equations, depending
on how the independent variables were specified, were estimated.
These equations are shown in Appendix

V-B at the end of this chapter.

Equation 5 was selected as the best equation to use because although
it had a slightly smaller R^ than equations 6 , 7, and 8 , its DurbinWatson value was high enough to conclude, at the .01 level of signifi
cance, that

autocorrelation does not exist among the error terms.

The Durbin-Watson values for equations 6 , 7, and 8 were all in the
indeterminate range.

Likewise, equations 10 and 11 had higher Durbin-

Watson values, indicating less correlation among the error terms than
in equation 5, but the R^s for equations 10 and 11 were much lower.

Ill

Equation 5 is shown below.

The t-values are in parentheses,

below the respective coefficients.

XI, X2, X6, X7, and X8 are all

significant at the .05 level of significance.
log Ed = -0.257 - 0.393 log XI + 0.292 log X2 - 0.042 log X3
(-0.49) (-7.57)

(2.16)

(-0.27)

+ 0.223 log X4 + 0.236 X5 + 0.810 X6 + 1.024 X7
(1.88)

(1.27)

(4.92)

(3.84)

+ 0.081 X8 + 0.012 X9 + 0.016 X10
(12.74)
R

=

(0.36)

(0.26)

.5604

D.W. = 1.7173
The results of this equation reveal that slightly over one-half
of the variation of elasticity of loan demand has been explained. The fact
that both structural variables, XI and X8, are significant and in the pre
dicted direction indicates that increased competition between banks and
other credit-granting institutions force banks to become more com
petitive.

The positive coefficient for X2 reveals that as incomes

rise, the elasticity of loan demand rises, perhaps indicating that
indeed a better educated public does shop around more closely for
better loan terms.

The two other demand variables that are statis

tically significant, X6 and X7, both have positive coefficients.
indicates that, ceteris paribus, the demand for real estate and

This
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consumer Installment loans Is more elastic than the overall demand
for loans.
What is important for this dissertation is that the equation
indicates that both hypotheses can be accepted.

First* XI* popula

tion per bank* is statistically significant and negatively correlated
with the elasticity of loan demand.

Thus, the higher is population

per bank* the lower is the elasticity of loan demand.

By restricting

the number of new bank formations below what it would otherwise have
been* chartering officials have served to reduce social welfare by
increasing population per bank.
statistically significant.

Secondly* neither dummy variable is

This indicates that, holding all other

variables in the model constant* branching of any sort does not lead
to an Improvement in bank performance over unit-banking.

Furthermore*

since population per bank increases as branching laws become more
liberal, and population per bank is negatively related to the elas
ticity of loan demand, it can be concluded that the more liberal are
branching laws, the more monopoly power that arises, and the greater
are losses to social welfare.

THE ESTIMATION OF WELFARE LOSSES FROM THE
RESTRICTION OF NEW BANK ENTRY

In this section of the chapter the welfare losses from the
restrictive chartering philosophy embodied in by the Banking Act
of 1935 will be estimated.

The first step is to estimate welfare

.1.13

losses as they actually exist in the presence of regulation.
losses are the result of both market and political forces.

These
Not all

the monopolistic element in banking can be attributed to restrictive
chartering policies.

The next step is to estimate the number of

banks that would hypothetically exist in each economic area had
restrictive chartering not existed.

Then the equation stated in the

first section of the chapter will be used to determine how much the
actual elasticity of loan demand will increase as the population per
bank decrease in each economic area.

A new welfare loss will be com

puted which will be the loss due to market imperfections.

This loss

will be subtracted from the previously computed loss to give a loss
due to restrictive bank chartering.6
This procedure can best be shown by example, again referring to
Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida.

An average demand curve

for all loans over the years 1968-1974 is shown in Figure V-A.

This

demand curve, and those for all economic areas, it is assumed, has
constant elasticity, throughout the relevant range to be used in this
study.

As shown earlier, this demand curve for Economic Area 9 for

the state of Florida was estimated to have an elasticity of 8.894.
**In Chapter II it was noted that there has been a tendency for
increased liberalization of branching laws. This has led to a gen
eral increase in population per bank nationwide. However, it is
safe to assume that this tendency for Increased liberalization of
branching laws is Independent of whether or not the Banking Act of
1935 had been enacted. In other words the nationwide population per
bank would be higher than in 1935 even if the Banking Act of 1935
did not exist. Therefore an estimation of the population per bank
that would exist in each economic area in the absence of restrictive
chartering should not be biased by changes in branching laws since 1935.
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The average unit cost of extending loans was found to be 1.76 as a
percentage of each dollar invested.
is shown as ACL in Figure V-A.

This cost, assumed constant,

The average return on loans and state

and local bonds for the period 1968-1974 was 8.45 per cent, and that
on the U.S. securities was 5.74 per cent.
7.50 per cent.

Summing ARg and AC^ gives

The average amount of loans held by banks during this

time period was 2.38 billion dollars.?

Now, the total welfare loss

in this economic area can be found by estimating the area of triangle
ABC.
Since it has already been assumed that the demand curve for each
economic area exhibits constant elasticity throughout the relevant
range of output, an estimate of the welfare loss cannot be provided
by simply multiplying distance AB by BC and taking half of this value.
This is because the demand curve is not linear.

If it were, it would

be impossible to assume that it had constant elasticity throughout.
However, the area of ABC can be derived by a iterative process.
The intent is to estimate, as closely as possible, smaller areas
within area ABC.

By estimating smaller areas than ABC, linearity

of the line segment AC can be approached.

This process can best

be shown by viewing Figure V-B, which represents, again, loan
demand conditions for Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida.

?These figures are derived from the FDIC’s yearly publication,
Bank Operating Statistics.
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Figure VrA
Loan Demand and Cost Conditions for
Economic Area 9 for the State of Florida

8.45

AR,

5.74

(Ed - 8.894)
1.76

2.38

Credit Flow
(in billions of dollars)

Figure V 7B
An Estimation of Welfare Losses for Economic
Area 9 for the State of Florida

8.45

8.25

8.00
7.75

7.50

ARg + AC.

(Ed - 8.894)

2.38

2.88

3.66

4.68

6.02

Credit Flow
(in billions of dollars)

117

The first area

to be estimated is area a_.

This is done

first by considering how much credit demanded would expand if the
average rate of interest dropped from 8.45 per cent to 8.25 per cent.
This is where the elasticity of loan demand becomes important.

Q

For

this economic area, a drop in the interest rate of 0.20 per cent, or
2.38 per cent of its previous value, would cause credit demand to
expand by 8.894 x 2.38 = 21.167 per cent of its previous value.
Credit demand would then expand by 0.504 billion dollars, to 2.884
billion dollars.
area

a.

We now have the necessary information to compute

Multiplying .0020 by 0.504 gives

1.008 million dollars.9

One-half of this figure, 0.504 million dollars, gives an estimate of
the welfare

loss for

in the same manner.

area a_.

Areas t>, ic, and

d^ were estimated

The interest rate was arbitrarily lowered and

credit demand was hypothetically increased by a certain amount, giving
the dimensions for each triangle.

For example, when the interest rate

was reduced from 8.25 to 8.00, credit demanded expanded by 0.774 bil
lion dollars.

The welfare loss of

area b^ is then estimated as

(0.777 x 0025)/2 = 0.971 million dollars.
welfare

loss estimates for

The same procedure gave

areas c^ and d^ of 1.272 and 1.680

million dollars respectively.
O

In estimating these smaller areas for all the economic
the interest rate was aribtrarily dropped by 0.25 percentage
unless the actual rate was a multiple of 0.25. In this case
average return was lowered by an amount that would result in
next base rate being a multiple of 0.25.

regions
points
the
the

^The figure .0020 is used to convert percentages into dollars.
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To get the estimate for the entire welfare loss for area
ABC, however, rectangles je, _f, and £ must also be estimated.

The

area of e_ is equal to .0025 times 0.504 billion dollars; the area
of rectangle _f is equal to .0025 times 0.77 billion dollars; the area
of rectangle

is equal to .0025 times 1.017 billion dollars.

The

sum of these three rectangles is equal to 5.755 million dollars.
When this sum is auded to the estimates for

areas a, _b, £, and d,

the result is 10.182 million dollars, the amount of welfare losses
that existed in this area, as a yearly average, for the period 19681974.
To find out the proportion of these welfare losess due to
restrictive chartering policies the model estimated earlier in the
chapter must be used.

This model states that for every one per cent

change in population per bank the elasticity of loan demand will change
by 0.393 per cent.

What is necessary, then, is to obtain an estimate

of the hypothetical average number of banks that would exist for the
years 1968 and 1974 in the absence of restrictive chartering.

The

updated Peltzman model of Chapter II will provide this estimate.
As stated on page 35 of Chapter II, had restrictive chartering not
existed, it is estimated that 19,321 independent banks would have
existed at the end of 1974.

Had the estimation process ended in 1968,

I

the number of independent banks in existence, if restrictions had not
existed, would have been 18,800.

The hypothetical average for the

period 1968-1974 is then 19,060, compared to the actual average of
14,078 banks.
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The hypothetical number of banks In each economic area can be
estimated by assuming that, for each area, the proportion of banks
in the United States that actually existed in that area for the
period 1968-1974 would be the same without regulation.

For example,

Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida had, for the period 19681974, an average of 77.5 banks per year.
the actual national average.

This was 0.55 per cent of

It is assumed that the same proportion

of banks would exist in the absence of chartering restrictions.

Thus,

without the regulation of new bank entry, the average number of banks
for 1968-1974 in this economic area would be 19,060 x .0055, or 94
banks.
Using
this area.

this figure will give a new

population per bank figure for

With restictive chartering the actual population per bank

was 16.45 thousand people per bank.

Without regulation the figure

would have been 13.48 thousand people per bank, a 18.1 per cent
decrease from the actual value.

Now, according to the elasticity

model presented earlier in the chapter, a 1 . 0 0 per cent change in
population per bank causes a 0.393 per cent change in the elasticity
of loan demand.

Thus, for Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida,

it is predicted that, in the absence of chartering restrictions, the
elasticity of loan demand would rise by 18.1 x 0.393 ■ 7.11 per cent,
to a value

of 9.525.

Using this new elasticity figure, and assuming

the new demand curve in the

absence of regulation has constant elas

ticity throughout, a new welfare loss can be estimated that is due
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solely to Imperfections in the market.
the previously computed value will give

Subtracting this value from
the welfare losses from

restrictive chartering policies.
The estimation of these new welfare losses is described in
Figure V-C, which again represents conditions for Economic Area 9
for the state of Florida.
by

area

DBC.

These new welfare losses are represented

For the sake of simplicity in comparing welfare

losses under both circumstances, it is assumed that the hypothetical
demand curve intersects the actual curve at point C, the point which
equated the price of loans to their opportunity cost.
What will be

necessary is to work in an opposite manner from the

estimation of welfare losses in Figure V-B.

Here we will start from

point C, and then determine how much the interest rate would have to
rise to reduce credit demand by certain finite amounts, until gradually
point B, the actual average amount of credit extended during the
period 1968-1974 is reached.

For example, at point C, credit demanded,

and extended, is 6.021 billion dollars.

If it drops to 5.0 billion

dollars, a

reduction of 16.9 per cent, it means the interest rate had

to rise by

16.9/9.525 = 1.67 percent from its previous value, to

7.64 per cent.

This gives the dimensions for

welfare loss represented by this
million dollars.
manner.

dollars in

were estimated in the same

extended was reduced by 1.0 billion

each case, except for

0.62 billion dollars.

The

area is 1/2 (.0012 x 1.021) = 0.613

Areas b, £, and

Credit demanded and

area £.

area (i,

where

it was

reduced by

Rectangles _e, _f, and £ could then be computed
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Figure V-C
A Reestimation of Welfare Losses for Economic
Area 9 For the State of Florida

8.45

8.12

7.97
7.77
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7.50

<Ed - 9.525)

(Ed - 8.894)
2.38

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.02
Credit Flow
(in billions of dollars)
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by using the dimensions of
of area

areas a, b, £, and cl.

DBC is 8.602 million

dollars,

The total area

the estimated welfare loss

that remains even in the absence of restrictive chartering.
The final step is to subtract this figure of 8.602 million dollars
from the actual welfare loss of 10.182 million dollars, leaving the
welfare losses due to restrictive chartering of 1.580 million dollars.
This means that a little over 15 per cent of total welfare losses in
this area were due to restrictive chartering.
This procedure was followed for all 297 economic areas.

10

For

the nation as a whole, the estimated welfare losses as they actually

Special care had to be taken in deriving a hypothetical popu
lation per bank figure for statewide-branching states and those
limited-branching areas in which inter-county branching is allowed.
A potential problem arises because the total number of independent
banks in each county is summed over all counties. This will give a
higher figure than for the number of independent banks in that area.
To account for this, the proportion of total banks in that economic
area, as listed by the FDIC, was assumed the same with and without
regulation. Then the ratio “ B^j, where B.^ is the number of banks
i=l

in economic area i, as it actually exists, was multiplied by the
hypothetical number of banks in the economic area without regulation
to get an adjusted number of banks for that area.
For example, the
state of Alaska had an average of ten banks per year existing in the
state over the years 1968-1974. This was 0.07 per cent of the total
number of banks in the country over the same time period. Applying
this percentage to 15,626, the number of banks in the absence of
chartering restrictions, resulted in eleven banks. Now, during the
period 1968-1974, the average number of banks in each county in
Alaska, summed over all counties, was thirty, or three times the
total number of banks in the state. Applying this ratio to the hypo
thetical number of baqks in the absence of regulation, eleven, gives
thirty-three, the adjusted number of banks. With a 1970 population
of 300 thousand, the population per bank figure fell from 10.00
thousand to 9.09 thousand.

123

exist were 928.53 million dollars, while those in the absence of
regulation were 868.99 million dollars.

This means that the esti

mated welfare losses due to the restrictions on bank chartering
were, on the average during the years 1968-1974, 59.54 million
dollars, or 6.0 per cent of the total.

11 A list of these welfare

losses, by state, is shown in Appendix V-C.

^ r o m this evidence, it appears that market imperfections are
responsible for the vast majority of monopoly power in commercial
banking. This dissertation does not discuss these imperfections;
however, a good source of information on this subject can be found
in David Alhadeff, "Barriers to Bank Entry," Southern Economic Journal.
Vol. 40, (April, 1974), pp. 589-603.

APPENDIX V-A
STATEWIDE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 3
FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1974

Unlt-Bariklng States
State

Elasticity of Loan Demand

Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Illinois
Kansas
Iowa
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Texas
West Virginia
Wyoming

15.01
9.13
13.05
37.50
19.32
26.04
15.94
48.04
8.05
39.54
17.15
12.14
18.38
51.04
9.21

Average

22.64

A

“Defined a s

i

±1, where e t j is the elasticity
nj
J
of loan demand for area 1 in state
and n. is
the number of economic areas in that state.

APPENDIX V-A
(Continued)

Limited-Branching States
State

Elasticity of Loan Demand

Alabama
Georgia
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Wisconsin

17.82
12.39
30.60
33.50
14.38
27.57
10.40
12.20
9.65
19.82
7.75
17.27
36.12
30.36
10.78
23.59

Average

19.64

APPENDIX V-A
(Continued)

Statewide-Branching States
State

Elasticity of Loan

Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Maine
Maryland
Nevada
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

4.98
21.61
8.57
18.39
20.33
5.96
6.37
9.25
76.23
7.50
9.40
7.70
11.85
10.83
15.20
6.70
17.08
17.44
10.65

Average

15.05

APPENDIX V-B
REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND3
R2

Independent Variables

Ed

D.W.

0.109 - 0.392 logXl + 0.321 logX2 - 0.324 logX3 + 0.021 logX4
(0.20) (-7.31)*

(2.28)*

(-2.26)*

(0.19)

1. log Ed

.536

1.611

.550

1.599

.549

1.606

-0.008 logX5 + 0.283 logX 6 + 0.425 logX7 + 0.771 logX 8 + 0.001 X9 - 0.02 X10
(-0.21)

(4.06)*

(3.40)*

(12.17)*

(0.04)

(-0.33)

0.508 - 0.404 logXl + 0.274 logX2 - 0.222 logX3 + 0.113 logX4
(0.96) (-7.64)*

(1.97)*

(-1.57)

(1.02)

2 . log Ed

+0.001 logX5 + 0.280 logX 6 + 0.384 logX7 + 0.081 X 8 + 0.019 X9 + 0.017 X10
(0.03)

(4.07)*

(3.12)*

(12,70)*

(0.56)

(0.29)

0.185 - 0.399 logXl + 0.264 logX2 - 0.199 log X3 + 0.137 logX4
(0.34) (-7.57)*

(1.90)

(-1.40)

(1.23)

3. log Ed
+ 0.005 logX5 + 0.303 logX 6 + 0.702X7 + 0.081 X 8 + 0.018 X9 + 0.016 X10
(0.13)
(4.41)*
(3.06)* (12.73)*
(0.55)
(0.27)
£

t-statistics are in parentheses; an asterisk indicates the coefficient is significant at the
.05 level.

APPENDIX V-B
(Continued)
R2

Independent Variables

Bd

D.W.

-0.191 - 0.398 logXl + 0.284 logX2 - 0.107 logX3 + 0.166 logX4
(0.36) (-7.61)*

(2.07)*

(-0.74)

(1.51)

4. log

.558

1.632

.560

1.717

.563

1.643

.563

1.644

+ 0.017 logX5 + 0.701 X 6 + 0.841 X7 + 0.081 X 8 + 0.008 X9 + 0.012 X10
(0.42)

(5.03)*

(3.64)*

(12.67)*

(0.25)

(0.21)

-0.257 - 0.392 logXl + 0.291 logX2 - 0.041 logX3 + 0.222 logX4
(-0.49) (-7.57)*

(2.16)*

(-0.27)

(1 .8 8 )

5. log Ej
+ 0.236 X5 + 0.810 X 6 + 1.024 X7 + 0.081 X 8 + 0.012 X9 + 0.015 X10
(1.27)

(4.92)*

(3.84)*

(12.74)*

(0.36)

(0.26)

- 0.577 - 0.402 logXl + 0.301 logX2 + 0.002 logX3 + 0.662 X4
(-1.14) (-7.73)*

(2.25)*

(0.013)

(2.35)*

6 . log
+ 0.286 X5 + 0.865 X 6 + 1.077 X7 + 0.080 X 8 + 0.014 X9 + 0.014 X10
(1.53)

(5.17)*

(4.01)*

(13.13)*

(0.42)

(0.23)

-0.605 - 0.403 logXl + 0.303 logX2 + 0.042 X3 + 0.673 X4
(-1.09) (-7.74)*

(2.26)*

(0 .1 2 )

(2.39)*

7. log Ed
+ 0.296 X5 + 0.873 X 6 + 1.086 X7 + 0.080 X 8 + 0.014 X9 + 0.014 X10
(1.58)

(5.21)*

(4.04)*

(13.13)*

(0.43)

(0.24)

APPENDIX V-B
(Continued)
R2

Independent Variables

Ed

D.W.

0.422 - 0.405 logXl + 0.00002 X2 + 0.039 X3 + 0.669 X4
(2.08)* (-7.74)*

(2.19)*

(0.11)

(2.37)*

8 . log Ed

.563

1.645

.519

1.666

.378

1.756

.413

1.737

+ 0.301 X5 + 0.864 X 6 + 1.096 X7 + 0.080 X 8 + 0.015 X9 + 0.008 X10
(1.60)

(5.15)*

(4.06)*

(13.03)*

(0.47)

(0.12)

0.291 - 0.007 XI + 0.00001 X2 - 0.217 X3 + 0.551 X4 + 0.469 X5
(1.35) (-5.35)*

(1.38)

(-0.58)

(1.84)

(2.39)*

9. log Ed
+ 0.887 X 6 + 0.901 X7 + 0.079 X 8 - 0.023 X9 - 0.042 X10
(5.05)*

(3.21)*

(12.25)*

(-0.68)

(-0.68)

-34.630 + 44.333 [1/(X12)] + 0.0001 X2 - 26.759 X3 + 22.941 X4
(-1.92)

(2.74)*

(0.17)

(-0.86)

(0.96)

1 0 . Ed

+ 22.927 X5 + 63.811 X 6 + 62.791 X7 + 4.909 X 8 - 5.61 X9 - 6.88 X10
(1.37)

(4.32)*

(2.67)*

(9.11)*

(-2.08)*

(-1.32)

-52.828 + 56.359 (1/X1) + 0.0005 X2 - 12.101 X3 + 36.457 X4 + 15.108 X5
(-2.93)*

(4.99)*

(0.67)

(-0.39)

(1.56)

1 1 . Ed

+ 62.658 X 6 + 73.543 X7 + 5.038 X 8 - 2.732 X9 - 4.202 X10
(4.37)*

(3.20)*

(9.20)*

(-1.01)

(-0.82)

(0.92)

APPENDIX V-B
(Continued)
R2

Independent Variables

Ed

D.W.

- 10.711 - 0.483 XI + 0.0005 X2 - 24.032 X3 + 53.802 X4 + 31.733 X5
(-2.29)* (-4.32)*
12 •

(0.71)

(-0.79)

(2.18)*

(1.97)*

Ed

.401

1.697

.399

1.641

+ 60.802 X 6 + 67.275 X7 + 5.277 X 8 - 1.809 X9 - 4.991 X10
(4.19)*

(2.91)*

(9.82)*

(-0.64)

(-0.96)

- 45.28 - 26.71 logXl + 21.49 logX2 - 25.13 logX3 + 4.06 logX4
(-1.02) (-5.92)*
13.

E,
a

(1.81)

(-2.09)*

(0.43)

+ 0.25 logX5 + 17.34 logX6 + 36.30 logX7 + 48.10 logX 8 + 0.39 X9 - 3.25 X10
(0.07)

(2.95)*

(3.45)*

(9.03)*

(0.13)

(-0.63)

Source of data: Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation, Bank Operating Statistics, 1968 through
1974; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Functional Cost Analysis, 1966 through 1 9 7 3 j
U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1970, State EconomiF~5reas,
1970; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits in All Commercial Banks, 1968 and 1974.
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APPENDIX V-C
AVERAGE YEARLY WELFARE LOSSES, BY STATE, 1968-1974
(In millions of dollars)

Welfare Losses

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

With Regulation
4.92
3.36
5.58
4.75
219.47
18.89
15.12
2.17
24.44
18.91
11.46
1.79
6.09
5.04
4.81
6.45
2.20

18.15
5.73
2.42
14.48
28.14
25.47
14.48
3.26
5.85
2.90
6.06
1.44
3.43
4.22
119.74
29.67
4.39

Without Regulation
4.67
3.05
4.64
4.56
212.36
18.16
14.03
2.00

23.47
18.18
9.42
0.39
5.76
4.60
4.39
5.81
1.98
16.40
5.51
2.33
12.98
26.67
23.07
13.73
2.95
5.46
2.67
5.73
1.28
2.88

3.78
108.09
27.60
4.05

Due to
Regulation

■

0.25
0.31
0.94
0.1'9
7.11
0.73
1.09
0.17
0.97
0.73
2.04
1.40
0.33
0.44
0.42
0.64
0.22

1.75
5.14
0.09
1.50
1.47
2.40
0.75
0.31
0.39
0.23
0.33
0.16
0.55
0.44
11.65
2.07
0.34
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APPENDIX V-C
(Continued)

Welfare Losses

State

With Regulation

Without Regulation

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

14.26
25.28
17.02
6.71
4.40
12.36
3.61
30.36
113.77
5.90
0.44
23.11
19.26
0.63
6.28

12.78
23.77
15.87
6.09
3.89
11.16
3.00
29.44

1.12

5.35
0.33
19.69
17.22
0.54
5.16
0.95

Total

928.53

868.99

111. 10

Due to
Regulation
1.48
1.51
1.15
0.62
0.51
1.20

0.61
0.92
2.67
0.55
0.11

3.42
2.04
0.09
1.12

0.17
59.54

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

The purpose of this dissertation was to study the effects of
official alterations in the structure of commercial banking on social
welfare.

In doing so it was first described, in Chapter II, how these

official actions, i.e., the restriction of new bank chartering and the
restrictions placed on branching, have actually affected market struc
ture in banking.

It was shown that the restriction of new bank

charters by both the Comptroller of the Currency and the various state
banking commissions has served to reduce the rate of new bank formation
since 1935, thus raising the number of customers being serviced by any
one bank.

Furthermore, it was shown that the state laws concerning

branching have led to a greater population per bank the more liberal
are branching laws.
If market structure has been altered then it is possible that
official actions have indirectly affected bank performance.

In Chapter

III the literature concerning the relationship between market power in
banking and banking performance was reviewed.

Most of the studies

revealed a statistical relationship between market power and bank
performance.

However, these studies usually failed to isolate any
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separate effects on performance that are caused solely by differences
in branching laws.

And those studies which tried to do so applied

tests with such little rigor as to make them virtually meaningless.
Earlier studies also used the traditional variables, i.e.,
interest rates and loan/asset ratios as Indicators of bank performance.
In Chapter IV it was emphasized that if one's interest were to measure
the impact of market structure on social welfare, these two measures
are inadequate.
Chapter IV.

A theory of the banking firm was also developed in

From this theory arose the concept of the elasticity of

loan demand as the best Indicator of how market power in banking
affects social welfare.
Chapter V then revealed how market structure, as symbolized by
the variable population per bank, affected the elasticity of loan
demand for banks, and therefore Indirectly affected social welfare.
Because the statistical relationship was negative, it could be con
cluded that a policy of restrictions on new bank chartering, by
raising the value of population per bank in all economic areas, has
directly caused losses in social welfare.

Furthermore, it was shown

that there were no apparent gains from allowing banks to branch.

At

a given population per bank, the elasticity of loan demand was not
significantly higher for either limited or statewide-branching areas
than for unit-banking areas.

Furthermore, since population per bank

increases the more liberal are branching laws, it was concluded that
unit-banking fostered more competition, and thus lowered welfare
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losses.

The second section of the chapter actually estimated the

welfare losses from the restrictive chartering policies.
The first step in this latter process was to compute welfare
losses as they actually exist In each economic area.

The next step

was to estimate the amount of banks that would exist in each economic
area in the absence of regulation.

This latter estimation led to a

hypothetically lower population per bank figure for each economic
area.

The lower figure caused the elasticity of loan demand for each

area to increase, thus lowering welfare losses.

These new welfare

losses for each area were then computed and subtracted from the pre
vious loss.
each area.

The difference was the welfare loss due to regulation for
All three losses for each area— i.e., the losses as they

actually exist, those that would exist in the absence of regulation,
and the difference between these two— were then summed over all areas
to obtain estimates for the nation as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS

At the end of Chapter V it was concluded that six per cent of
total welfare losses in commercial banking could be attributed to
restricting the granting of new bank charters.
small percentage of the total.

Obviously, this is a

Market imperfections, i.e., economic

as opposed to legal barriers to entry, appear to be the primary reason
that there is a monopolistic element in the commercial banking industry.
One should not conclude from this evidence, though, that policy makers
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do not need to be overly concerned with lifting restrictions on
entry.

Any policy

that increases social welfare is certainly worth

considering.
One way that social welfare can be significantly increased is to
follow the recommendations of the 1971 President's Committee on
Financial structure and Regulation (the Hunt Commission).

It was

their suggestion that mutual savings banks and savings and loan asso
ciations be allowed to compete in the same loan markets as commercial
banks.

Presently the number of mutual savings banks and savings and

loan associations number about one-half the number of commercial banks.
To allow these other financial intermediaries the right to compete in
the same loan market would, in effect, raise the number of commercial
banks in this country by about fifty per cent.

This would be expected

to have a depressing influence on interest rates charged on loans while
alleviating some of the restriction of loan output caused by existing
monopolistic elements in commercial banking.
A conclusion about branching is not so easily reached.

Unit-

banking does appear to foster greater competition in the loan market,
and for that reason leads to lower losses in social welfare than does
limited or statewide-branching.

However, this advantage of unit-

banking is a result of considering only the prices banks charge for
their loans.

One cannot ignore the fact that population per bank

office decreases the more liberal become branching laws.

One would

expect, then, that bank customers are at least offered more convenience
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the more liberal branching laws become.

This increased convenience

would be due to more available offices in which customers might
use any bank service, such as check-cashing and deposit services.
The increased convenience to customers would certainly represent an
increase in social welfare.

Unfortunately this type of social wel

fare is extremely hard to measure, and therefore was not considered
in this dissertation.
On the basis of the evidence considered, the conclusions about
branching, though tentative at best, is that unit-banking is optimum.
This conclusion is at odds with the Hunt Commission report, which
recommended that banks be allowed to branch statewide.

However, the

Hunt Commission proposal was made in the face of a scarcity of
research on the question of whether or not some form of branch banking
is optimum from the standpoint of social welfare.

While this disser

tation invites further research into the question, it is hoped that
some useful knowledge has been provided by the work done here.
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